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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of identication and estimation in the rst-price multi-
unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where bidders
submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. We show that
submitting a combination bid lower than the sum of the bids on the constituent routes
does not require cost synergies and can instead serve as a tool to leverage market power
across the di¤erent routes. As a result, the welfare consequences of allowing combina-
tion bidding in the rst price auction are ambiguous, and depend on the importance of
the cost synergies. We provide conditions for non-parametric identication of the mul-
tidimensional private information in the multi-unit rst price auction and derive partial
identication results when they are not satised. We propose an estimation method
consisting of two stages: In the rst stage, the distribution of bids is estimated para-
metrically. In the second stage, the (set of) costs and distribution(s) of costs consistent
with the observed behavior are inferred based on the rst order conditions for optimally
chosen bids. We apply the estimation method to data from the London bus routes mar-
ket. We quantify the magnitude of cost synergies and assess possible e¢ ciency losses
arising in this market.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of identication and estimation in the rst-price multi-
unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions held by the London Transportation authority
to award contracts to service bus routes. Two special features of these auctions are that
several bus routes are auctioned at the same time, and that bidders may submit combination
bids in addition to stand-alone bids. In other words, the London bus routes market is an
example of a combinatorial auction.
Combinatorial auctions allow bidders to transmit rich information regarding the value
they attach to the objects for sale. When bidders value bundles of objects di¤erently than
the sum of the constituent parts, allowing bids for a combination of routes is a necessary
condition for e¢ ciency and optimality. This was well understood by the London Trans-
portation authority. Indeed, two of the motivations for allowing combination bids in the
London bus routes market were: (i) that they would allow bidders to pass on some of the
cost savings resulting from cost synergies between routes through lower bids, and (ii) that
they would enhance the e¢ ciency of the allocation of routes across bidders.
However, allowing combination bids in the rst price auction may also hurt e¢ ciency
and costs. Section 2 introduces a model of a private value multi-unit rst price procure-
ment auction that allows for cost synergies between routes. Two distinct motivations for
combination bidding are illustrated. First, combination bidding gives rise to a strategic
e¤ect because biddersstand-alone bids compete with their combination bids. As a result,
bidders may nd it protable to inate their stand-alone bids relative to their combination
bids in order to favor the latter, even in the absence of any cost synergy. Second, when cost
synergies are important, the fact that combination bids do allow bidders to align their bids
better on their costs can help improve e¢ ciency and lower costs. As a result, the welfare
consequences of combination bidding depend on which motivation dominates.
How to disentangle the alternative motivations for combination bidding is an open em-
pirical question. This paper contributes to this question. In doing so, we follow the footsteps
of the seminal papers by Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) and Guerre, Perrigne
and Vuong (2000) who introduced an indirect approach to the empirical analysis of auc-
tions. The earlier directapproaches include those proposed by Donald and Paarsch (1993,
1996), La¤ont and Vuong (1993) and La¤ont, Ossard and Vuong (1995). These approaches
are all intrinsically parametric. The primitives, including the distribution of costs, are given
specic parametric forms. The estimation proceeds by choosing the value of the parameters
for which the equilibrium distribution of bids is as close as possible to the empirical distri-
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bution of bids. These approaches require solving for the equilibrium, which can be di¢ cult
and time-consuming.
Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) and Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000)
show that biddersrst order conditions for optimally chosen bids provide an expression
for their private information as a function of their bids and the distribution and density of
equilibrium bids. Since the bids are observable, the theoretical expressions involving the
distribution and density of bids can be replaced with the empirical counterparts suggesting
a two-step estimation method. In the rst step, the distribution and density of bids are
estimated. In the second step, the private information and the bidders distribution of
private information is estimated as a residual in the biddersrst order condition. The
method does not require the computation of equilibrium strategies.
The indirect approach has boosted research on non-parametric identication of auction
models (see Athey and Haile, 2004 for a survey of recent results) and, because the estimation
does not rely on the computation of the equilibrium bid functions, it has led to a rapid
development of auction applications beyond the single object symmetric independent private
value model (e.g. Li, Perrigne and Vuong, 2002, Campo, Perrigne and Vuong, 2003, Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003 and Athey, Levin and Seira, 2004).
Section 3 studies our identication problem. We assume that bidders assess their winning
probabilities correctly and choose bids to maximize their prots. We also assume that the
observed data capture all the relevant characteristics of the environment. The model is said
to be (non parametrically) identied under these assumptions, if the primitives, i.e. the
costs and the distribution of costs, can be uniquely inferred from the observed data.
As in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), our identication arguments are based on the
best response conditions given by the rst order conditions for optimal bids. Yet, there are
notable di¤erences between our identication problem and theirs.1 First, Guerre, Perrigne
and Vuong build on the known characterization of equilibrium in the single object inde-
pendent private value symmetric rst price auction to argue that the rst order condition
for optimal bids identies costs, for all bids above the reserve price. In our case, no such
characterization result is available. We prove a new partial characterization result for the
combinatorial rst price auction that justies when the rst order conditions can be used
for identication (Lemma 1). In some cases, optimal bids satisfy a set of inequalities rather
than a set of equalities and thus rst order conditions do not completely identify costs.
1Extensions of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuongs results and the relationship between our results and those
are discussed below under related literature.
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Second, optimal bids are characterized by a single rst order condition in the single object
auction, whereas they are characterized by a system of equations in our case. The conse-
quence is that identication requires an extra step to prove that this system of equations
admits a unique solution (Lemma 2). Third, in the single object independent private value
model, the main source of under-identication is the presence of a reserve price. In our case,
there are additional sources of underidentication. We address each of these systematically
and characterize what can be identied in each case.
Our results are as follows. The multi-unit rst price auction model is identied when
bidders actively bid, that is, submit bids that have a strictly positive probability of winning,
on all contracts and combinations thereof. In practice however, several factors may reduce
the dimensionality of the observed information. First, not submitting a bid that has a
positive probability of winning on all items can be part of equilibrium behavior. Second,
a constraint on bids, such as a reserve price, or the condition that combination bids must
be lower than the sum of the constituent bids, can further reduce the dimensionality of the
observed information. In these cases, partial identication emerges and a (non singleton)
set of costs and cost distributions is identied.
Section 4 turns to our application and describes the London bus routes market. This
market is particularly well-suited for this kind of analysis. First, there is a common percep-
tion that synergies between routes are prevalent. Second, combination bids are permitted
and play an important role in this market with about 30% of all routes won by combination
bids. Thus, our method allows us to quantify the extent of cost synergies in this market,
and therefore assess the role of combination bids.
Section 5 proposes our estimation method. The estimation proceeds in two stages. In
the rst stage, the multi-variate joint distribution of bids for all units is estimated. Due
to the multi-dimensionality of the bid vectors, and to incorporate covariates, we consider
a parametric bid density. In the second stage, the costs or the set of costs that rationalize
the bids are inferred by using the rst order conditions for optimal bids.
Section 6 reports our estimates. We illustrate the biddersobjective function by using
the estimated winning probability. The estimates suggest that bidders may nd it protable
to submit a combination bid less than the sum of stand-alone bids even in the absence of
cost synergies. We report our bound estimates on possible cost synergies. We nd little
evidence of cost synergies. Our estimates suggest that a route combination costs more than
the sum of stand-alone costs on average. A possible explanation is that the technology of
operating buses in London depends on the garage capacity and the number of garages a
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bidder has available. As the number of buses in the eet approaches the available garage
capacity it becomes increasingly costly to take on additional buses or routes. At the end of
this section, we use our cost estimates to assess bounds on possible e¢ ciency losses.
Related literature. There is a growing literature on identication and estimation in
auctions. Donald and Paarsch (1993), La¤ont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), Guerre, Perrigne
and Vuong (2000) and others propose identication results and estimation techniques to
infer biddersprivate information (Athey and Haile, 2004, provide a survey of identication
results in auctions). The literature focuses to a large extent on the single-unit auction model
and little is known about auctions in which multiple units are sold. Exceptions include the
sequential auctions analyzed by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Donald, Paarsch
and Robert (2005) and the simultaneous auctions of homogenous goods analyzed, among
others, by Hortacsu (2002), Wolak (2003), Fevrier, Preget and Visser (2004), Hortacsu
and Puller (2005) and Kastl (2005). Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer propose an estimation
techniques to measure linkages between items sold at sequential auctions. They nd ev-
idence of substitutes at sequential highway procurement auctions. Hortacsu (2002) and
Fevrier, Preget and Visser (2004) study share auctions for treasury bills, and Wolak (2003)
and Hortacsu and Puller (2005) study electricity auctions. Assuming that the equilibrium
bid functions are strictly decreasing demand functions and generate a residual supply for
bidders that has no kinks, Hortacsu (2002) shows that the private value multi-unit dis-
criminatory auction model is non parametrically identied. Wolak (2003) discusses in more
details how constraints on bids, such as the requirement that bids belong to a price grid,
a¤ect identication. Finally, McAdams (2005) has recently argued that the homogeneous
good multi-unit auction model is only partially identied in general, and that previous ap-
proaches relied on more or less implicit identication assumptions on optimal bids. The
identication problem in share auctions is close to ours in the sense that the model is also
multi-dimensional and identication proceeds via the rst order condition of optimal bids.
Yet, a key di¤erence between our setting with heterogeneous goods and the share auction
model with homogeneous and divisible goods is that demand is identied by a vector of
costs (c1; :::; cS) 2 R2m 1 in our setting whereas it is identied by a marginal valuation
function in share auctions. This leads to di¤erent mathematical structures.
The rst order condition of equilibrium prices as an estimation condition features dom-
inantly in the empirical literature on di¤erentiated products. Goldberg (1995) incorporates
quota constraints into the estimating equations, which result in Kuhn-Tucker conditions
as in our framework. A distinguishing feature of our auction problem is that bidders have
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incomplete information about opponentscosts and bids. In Goldberg, rms have complete
information about opponentscosts and prices leading to distinct best response conditions.
There has also been a number of recent theoretical analyses of auctions of heterogenous
objects. Among these, Armstrong (2000) and Avery and Hendershott (2000) derive proper-
ties of the optimal multi-unit auction when types are multidimensional and objects may be
substitutes or complements. A central question that these authors address is to what extent
the auctioneer may benet from bundling the objects (A seminal contribution to this ques-
tion is Palfrey, 1983). Krishna and Rosenthal (1995) and Branco (1997) study the second
price multi-unit auction with synergies. Milgrom (2000) highlights some perverse e¤ects of
combinatorial bidding in ascending auctions. Our analysis contributes to this literature by
highlighting the motivations and consequences of combination bidding in the combinatorial
rst price auction. The strategic motivation we uncover is analogous to the bundling moti-
vation in the (decision-theoretic) multi-dimensional screening literature (McAfee, McMillan
and Whinston, 1989, Armstrong, 1996 and Armstrong and Rochet, 1999) but it had never
been pointed out in the auction context.
Finally, the importance of synergies in multi-unit auctions has been emphasized by the
recent experience in FCC spectrum auctions. Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee and McMillan
(1997) and Moreton and Spiller (1998) use a regression analysis to measure synergy e¤ects
in these auctions. Other recent applications of combinatorial auctions include the auctions
for school meals in Chile (Epstein, Henriquez, Catalan, Weintraub and Martinez, 2002)
and corporate procurement applications at Sears and Home Depot. (Cramton, Shoham
and Steinberg, 2006, provide a survey of recent issues and applications in combinatorial
auctions.)
2 Bidding environment
This section introduces the model and highlights its key properties.
2.1 Model
Our model integrates the salient features of the London bus routes market. A procurement
agency (the buyer) simultaneously invites bids onm routes fromN risk neutral bidders. A
contract covers a single route or a combination of routes. Each bidder i privately observes
a cost draw, cis 2 R, for each contract. We let S denote the set of routes. To simplify
notations, we adopt the convention that s  S means that s is a non empty subset of S:
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Let ci = (cis)sS : (Vectors and matrices are in bold, scalars are in standard fonts). We say
there is no cost synergy if cis + c
i
t = c
i
s[t for contracts s and t with s \ t = ;; where cis[t
denotes bidder is cost for the combination of contracts s and t. Cost synergies are positive
if costs are strictly subadditive, cis[t < cis + cit, and negative if cis[t > cis + cit.
Information. Bidderscontract costs are independently distributed according to the dis-
tribution Fi(:jX) : Ci  R(2m 1) ! [0; 1]; i = 1; :::N; where X = (x;w) denotes a vector
of observable contract characteristics x and bidder characteristics w: We assume that Fi is
common knowledge and that Fi and Ci satisfy the following condition:
Assumption 1: For all i; Ci has a non empty interior and Fi has a strictly positive and
continuous density on Ci.
Let F be the set of distribution functions that satisfy Assumption 1. The assumption
that Ci has a non empty interior ensures that the distribution is not degenerate and that
biddersprivate information is indeed of dimension 2m   1: The assumption on the density
is exible. It allows independence and correlation or a¢ liation in bidders costs across
contracts.
Auction rule. We consider the auction rule used in the London bus routes market. Bidders
may submit bids on all contracts: Let bis denote bidder is bid on contract s, and let b
i =
(bi1; :::; b
i
s; :::; b
i
S) 2 R2
m 1. Bidders pay the value of their winning bids and the buyer selects
the winner(s) based on the allocation that minimizes her total payment (rst price auction).
In the London bus route market, the buyer imposes the additional requirement that bids
be subadditive, that is, bis[t  bis + bit for all s; t such that s \ t = ;. There may also be a
reserve price. Let Rs denote the reserve price for contract s. Bids on or above the reserve
price are rejected. Ties are resolved by randomizing over all cost-minimizing allocations.
Payo¤s. Fix bidder i; and for each contract s  S; dene b is as the value of the cheapest
allocation of the routes in s among bidder is opponents. Formally, let PNni(s) dene the
set of partitions of s into N   1 (possibly empty) subsets. Let t = (t1; :::; ti 1; ti+1; :::tN )
denote an element of PNni(s): Then,
b is = min
t2PNni(s)
X
j 6=i
bjtj (1)
where, by convention, bj; = 0: Note that by construction b
 i
s is subadditive.
Given the auction rules and biddersrisk neutrality, bidder is payo¤ is given by (ignoring
ties): (
bis   cis if bis + b iSns < mintS; t6=sfbit + b iSnt; b iS g
0 otherwise
(2)
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2.2 Properties
Not much is known about the general properties of the equilibrium in this auction, beyond
the fact that an equilibrium exists. When the support of costs is bounded, the game satises
the conditions of Theorem 1 of Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame (2002) for a (mixed
strategy) equilibrium with endogenous tie-breaking rule. When values are private, we can
argue that whenever ties occur, bidders are indi¤erent among the ways in which they are
resolved.2 Hence, the equilibrium of the extended game with endogenous tie-breaking rule
is also an equilibrium of the original game.
Additionally, we can get some insight into the bidding behavior we may expect at
equilibrium by drawing on the analogy between the biddersoptimization problem in this
auction and that of the multi-product monopolist. To x ideas consider a two-object auction
(the generalization to more objects is straightforward). Consider bidder i:With two objects,
there are four possible allocations between bidder i and his opponents: bidder i wins object
1 (and one of his opponents wins object 2, if bi1+b
 i
2 corresponds to the cost of the cheapest
allocation), he wins object 2 (and his opponents win object 1), he wins both objects or he
does not win anything.
Now consider object 1: Holding the distribution of the value of the cheapest allocation
among his opponents (b i1 ; b
 i
2 ; b
 i
12 ) xed, decreasing b
i
1 increases bidder is chance to win
exactly object 1 by lowering the price of allocation that corresponds to bi1 + b
 i
2 relative to
the others. But it decreases bidder is chance of winning object 2 or the package because it
could be the case that, had bidder i not lowered bi1; the value of the cheapest allocation was
bi2+b
 i
1 or b
i
12: Another way to look at this is in terms of the following trade-o¤. The benet
to bidder i from lowering his bid on object 1 is that he wins object 1 more often. The costs
are twofold. First, it lowers his prot margin whenever he wins object 1. Second, it reduces
his chance of winning object 2 alone or the package of objects 1 and 2. At equilibrium,
of course, bidder i chooses bid bi1 such that this marginal benet and these marginal costs
exactly balance one another. This trade-o¤ is at the heart of the multi-unit rst price
auction: biddersown bids compete with one another.
This is also a classic price discrimination trade-o¤, analogous to that present in the
multi-product monopolistic pricing problem. When the multi-product monopolist sets his
2A formal proof of this statement is provided in Lemma 1 below. The only di¤erence with analogous
arguments made for single object private value auctions (e.g. Maskin and Riley, 2000, and Jackson et al.,
2002) is that, here, changing the bid on one object not only changes the probability of winning that object
but also changes the probability of winning other objects.
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prices, he takes into account the fact that the price of a product a¤ects both the demand
for this product and the demand for other products.
To make this analogy more transparent, consider the multi-product monopolist problem.
For simplicity, suppose the monopolist is selling two products to a buyer with unit demand
and private information about his value for these products, vs; s 2 f1; 2; 12g: The buyer has
additive preferences, i.e. v1+v2 = v12: The monopolist sets a price, bs; for each product and
for the combination. Then, the buyer will buy product (or bundle) s if vs   bs > vt   bt for
all t 6= s and t  S and vs   bs > 0: Rearranging, and exploiting the fact that preferences
are additive, yields the following payo¤ for the monopolist:3(
bs   cs if bs + vSns < mintS; t6=sfbt + vSnt; vSg
0 otherwise
(3)
Comparing this expression with that obtained for the bidder in the combinatorial auction,
(2), it is clear that the biddersoptimization problem is identical to that of the monopolist
facing a buyer with additive preferences.4
Consequently, some of the results from the literature on monopolistic multiproduct
pricing apply to describe bidders best responses in our setting. McAfee, McMillan and
Whinston (1989) derive a su¢ cient condition for bundling to be protable for the mo-
nopolist with additive costs. They nd that when demand is independent across goods 
in our setting, whenever the value of the cheapest allocation among bidder is opponents
are additive and independently distributed across products  submitting a price for the
bundle that is lower than the sum of the individual prices is optimal for the monopolist.
Schmalensee (1984) examines the special case of gaussian demands. Armstrong and Rochet
(1999) solve for the global maximization of the multi-product monopolist when valuations
are binary. Their analyses conrm that bundling (the equivalent of submitting a combi-
nation bid b1[2 < b1 + b2) is protable unless there is strong correlation across buyers
valuations.
Two lessons emerge from the multi-product monopoly pricing literature. First, observ-
ing a combination bid lower than the sum of the bids for the constituent units in our data
is no guarantee that there are underlying cost synergies. Submitting a combination bid
can be protable exactly for the same reason why the multi-product monopolist nds price
discrimination protable. Section 3 explores how the additional knowledge about the envi-
3Consider: vs   bs > vt   bt i¤ bs + vt + vSnt[s   vt\s < bt + vs + vSnt[s   vt\s i¤ bs + vSns < bt + vSnt:
4With the caveat of course that the valuations are additive in (3) whereas they are subadditive in (2). In
that sense, (3) is nested in (2).
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ronment a bidder was facing when submitting his bids allows us to disentangle these two
motivations (cost synergies versus strategic price discrimination). Second, correlation in the
values of the cheapest allocation among biddersopponents across the di¤erent routes is an
important determinant of combination bidding (Schmalensee, 1984, McAfee, McMillan and
Whinston, 1989, Armstrong and Rochet, 1999). The more correlated these values are, the
more likely it is that cost synergies are the main driver of combination bidding. The less
correlated these bids are, the greater the motivation for strategic price discrimination.
2.3 Welfare
In the presence of cost synergies, allowing bidders to convey information about their costs
for the combinations of contracts, in addition to their costs for the individual contracts, is
a necessary condition for e¢ ciency (Groves, 1973, Clarke, 1971) and for optimality (Levin,
1997, Armstrong, 2000 and Avery and Hendershott, 2000). In fact, this is why the pro-
curement authority for the London bus routes allows combination bids in their tendering
process.
It is straightforward to generate examples where, indeed, allowing combination bids in
the multi-unit rst price auction improves e¢ ciency and lowers procurement costs. In this
subsection, we illustrate through a simple example that allowing combination bids may also
have costs. In the following example, an independent rst price auction for each contract is
e¢ cient and minimizes the expected procurement cost. Allowing combination bids destroys
e¢ ciency and increases expected procurement costs. In the example, the cause can be
traced back to the strategic (price discrimination) e¤ect identied above.
Example 1: There are two routes and three bidders. Bidders A and B are the local
bidders. They care only about one route. Bidder A has cost cA1 for route 1. Bidder B has
cost cB2 for route 2. Bidder C is a global bidder. He has an interest in both routes. (In
the context of our application, one can think of bidder C as having a garage between the
two routes, bidder A has his garage close to route 1 but far from route 2, etc.). Bidder
Cs costs are given by (cC1 ; c
C
2 ; c
C
12) where c
C
12 = c
C
1 + c
C
2 (no cost synergy). Costs are
private information and independently distributed across bidders. Moreover, assume that,
at the route level, bidders are symmetric. In other words, cA1 and c
C
1 have the same ex-ante
distribution, and so do cB2 and c
C
2 :
It is instructive to rst consider the scenario when combination bids are not allowed,
that is, the buyer holds two independent auctions, one for route 1 and the other for route
2. The allocation of each route is independent of the outcome and the bids for the other
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route. Since bidders are symmetric at the individual market level (only bidders A and C
bid on contract 1 and only bidders B and C bid on contract 2), the unique equilibrium
is symmetric and in strictly increasing strategies. Thus, the bidder winning route 1 is the
bidder who has the lowest cost for route 1 and similarly for route 2: the outcome is e¢ cient.
Moreover, if private information is one-dimensional, and conditional on the optimal reserve
price and the usual regularity condition, this simple auction format minimizes procurement
costs (Levin, 1997).5
Now suppose that bidders are allowed to submit combination bids. At equilibrium, the
global bidder will submit bids such that bC12 < b
C
1 + b
C
2 : Indeed, consider his optimization
problem. From his perspective, the values of the cheapest allocation of the routes among
his opponents, (b C1 ; b
 C
2 ) = (b
A
1 ; b
B
2 ); are independently distributed (since their costs are
independently distributed) and they are additive, b C12 = b
 C
1 +b
 C
2 . Therefore, the analysis
of McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) applies and bidder C will nd it advantageous
to submit a non trivial combination bid at equilibrium, bC12 < b
C
1 +b
C
2 :
6 Combination bidding
must take place in any equilibrium. The intuition is that the combination bid pools the two
contracts together and allows the global bidder to leverage any advantage he has for one
contract into the other. Indeed, suppose that bidder A has a very high cost realization for
route 1. Then, the global bidder has an advantage for that route. If the global bidder only
submits a combination bid, he reduces the toughness of the competition he faces for the
second route because bidder B needs to submit a really low bid to compensate for bidder
As high bid and have a chance to win. This mechanism, route linkage through combination
bidding, is analogous to the leverage theory in industrial organization (Whinston, 1989).
In this example, combination bidding hurts e¢ ciency because whether bidder A wins
route 1 or not, no longer depends on bidder As and bidder Cs costs only, but also on
bidder Bs cost (through the combination bid of the global bidder).
Moreover, if private information is one-dimensional, the expected procurement cost of
the combinatorial auction is also higher than the expected procurement cost resulting from
two independent rst price auctions. The argument for this claim relies on a version of the
revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981). When bidders are risk neutral and private
information is independently distributed across bidders, the expected procurement cost of
5The optimal auction when private information is multidimensional is not known for this setting.
6This argument implicitly assumes that bidder A only submits a bid on route 1 and bidder B only submits
a bid on route 2 at equilibrium. There is also a (degenerate) equilibrium where bidders only submit a bid on
the package (and no bids on the individual contracts). The same conclusion, ine¢ ciency and higher costs,
applies to this equilibrium.
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any incentive compatible allocation mechanism is fully determined by the allocation (see
Levin, 1997, for a derivation that applies to the environment here). We argued above that
the expected cost in the independent auctions case was the minimum attainable (and that
this is the unique allocation that reaches that minimum). We have also just argued that the
allocations di¤er across the two auction formats. Thus, the expected procurement cost in
the combinatorial auction must be strictly higher. By continuity, we can argue that if private
information is multidimensional but su¢ ciently correlated, the independent auctions format
still yields lower procurement costs than the combinatorial auction format.7 Moreover, the
result in McAfee, McMillan and Whinston extends to positive cost synergies and to low
enough negative cost synergies. Thus so does the result in example 1.
Understanding the costs and benets of allowing combination bids is an important policy
question. Example 1 suggests that the question of which format is better for the London
bus routes market is ultimately an empirical one because the answer depends on the nature
and extent of synergies present in the market.
3 Identication
This section describes our identication results for the combinatorial rst price auction. We
observe data on all bids, contract characteristics and bidder characteristics. We make the
following assumption on the data generation process:
Assumption 2: We observe a cross section of auction data, (bit; i = 1:::; N;Xt)Tt=1 from a
i.i.d. random sample of T independent auctions.8 There is no unobserved contract or bidder
heterogeneity, beyond the privately observed costs. The data is generated by equilibrium
play in which biddersbids are equal or above their costs (if there are multiple equilibria,
we assume that the same equilibrium is played in all auctions).9
7The revenue equivalence theorem generalizes to environments with multidimensional private information
(see Krishna and Perry, 2000).
8By convention, non submitted bids on some contracts are assigned an arbitrary large value that guar-
antees they never win.
9Equilibrium behavior requires that bidders are best responding to their opponentsequilibrium distribu-
tion of bids. The assumption that bidders play the same equilibrium in all auctions is a common, though not
trivial, assumption in empirical auction works. Bidding on or above costs follows from equilibrium behavior
for bids that win with positive probability, but it is not necessary for bids that have zero probability of
winning. This technical assumption is needed for the proof of Lemma 1 but is otherwise inessential for the
identication argument. Any equilibrium strategy where a bidder bids below his costs can be replaced by
an equilibrium strategy where these bids are at or above costs without a¤ecting bidderspayo¤s.
12
The model is said to be (non parametrically) identied if the primitives, i.e. the distri-
butions of costs Fi(:jX) 2 F ; can be uniquely inferred from the observed data under the
assumption that bidders play equilibrium strategies and that the observed data capture all
the relevant characteristics of the environment. The model is said to be partially identied
if Fi can be shown to belong to a proper subset of F for all i:
In this section we rst discuss the nature of the identication problem in the multi-unit
rst price auction and derive the needed equilibrium characterization results.
We then derive the conditions under which the model is identied. We nd that the
combinatorial rst price auction model is identied if, at equilibrium, bidders submit bids
that have a strictly positive probability to win all contracts (Theorem 1). Unfortunately,
we cannot a priori rule out irrelevant bids (i.e. bids that never win) as part of equilibrium
behavior. In section 3.2, we show that irrelevant bids on some contracts do not a¤ect the
identication of the costs of the other contracts. They remain identied. By contrast,
only bounds on the cost of the contract that received the irrelevant bid are identied. The
potential underidentication of the costs associated to some bid realizations implies that
the distribution of costs is only partially identied. A set of cost distributions rather than
a unique distribution of costs rationalizes the observed bids. However, we argue that the
implied bounds on the distribution can still be used for policy analysis.
Real-life combinatorial auctions may of course di¤er from the benchmark combinatorial
auctions by introducing further constraints on the set of observable bids. In section 3.3, we
examine two such constraints that arise in our application: reserve prices and the constraint
that bids on combinations be lower than the sum of the bids on the constituent parts. Both
constraints introduce an additional level of underidentication. Again, we derive bounds on
the costs and cost distributions when these constraints bind. However, unlike before, the
implied bounds on the distributions of costs do not, in general, provide bounds on policy
outcomes of interest. All distributions of costs consistent with equilibrium behavior must
be used to evaluate such policy outcomes.
3.1 Preliminaries
We start with the general (unconstrained) combinatorial rst price auction. Bidders submit
bids on all contracts, the auctioneer selects the cheapest bidder-bid allocation and the
winners pay the price of their winning bids. Ties are resolved by randomizing over all
cost-minimizing allocations..
Fix bidder i and let b i be the 2m   1 dimensional vector of the values of the cheapest
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allocation of each bundle among bidder is opponents (this was dened formally in (1)).
Given m routes, there are 2m possible allocations of the contracts between bidder i and his
opponents. Let Gs(:jX): R2m 1 ! [0; 1] denote the probability that a bid vector by bidder
i wins exactly contract s; conditional on some covariates X. The functions Gs are non
parametrically identied from the data when all submitted bids and all relevant contract
characteristics are observed. (In the following, we simplify notation by dropping the X
arguments in the Gs functions. They do not play any role in the identication.)
In the combinatorial rst price auction, bidders solve the following 2m   1 dimensional
optimization problem:
i(ci) = max
bi2R2m 1
X
sS
(bis   cis)Gs(bi) (P1)
Each function Gs is monotonically decreasing in bis (this makes bidder-bid combination
bis+b
 i
Sns more expensive) and monotonically increasing in b
i
t for t 6= s, so Gs is di¤erentiable
almost everywhere (a.e.) and with a bounded derivatives a.e. (Billingsley, 1995, thm 31.2).
Therefore, the objective function in (P1) is also a.e. di¤erentiable.
However, a.e. di¤erentiability of the objective function in (P1) is not enough to use
the rst order conditions for optimal bids as part of our identication strategy. To clarify
the nature of the problem, dene as Bi the set of bidder is equilibrium bids. It can be
partitioned into three subsets:
1. Bi1 = fbi 2 Bi : the objective function in (P1) is di¤erentiable at bi and the rst
order conditions of (P1) identify a unique cost vector cig
2. Bi2 = fbi 2 Bi : the objective function in (P1) is di¤erentiable at bi but the rst
order conditions of (P1) do not identify a unique cost vector cig
3. Bi3 = fbi 2 Bi : the objective function in (P1) is not di¤erentiable at big
Let i(:) denote the probability measure of bidder is equilibrium bids. Let (:) denote
the Lebesgue measure. The model is identied if we can associate a density to almost
every cost in iCi: Given the denition of Bi1;Bi2 and Bi3; this will be trivially the case if
i(Bi1) = 1. The model is partially identied otherwise.
These notations allow us to compare the nature of the identication problem here and
that in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000). Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong study the inde-
pendent private value single object rst price auction. Adapting it to a procurement model,
their bidders solve the following optimization problem:
i(ci) = max
bi2R
(bi   ci)G(bi)
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where G(:) is bidder is probability of winning as a function of his bid. Function G is
monotonically decreasing, so this optimization problem is also a.e. di¤erentiable with rst
order condition:
(bi   ci)G0(bi) =  G(bi) (4)
Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong appeal to the known characterization of the equilibrium in
the independent private values rst price auction to argue that G0(bi) is strictly positive
everywhere. Thus, we can rewrite (4) as
ci = bi +
G(bi)
G0(bi)
(5)
In words: when the biddersoptimization problem is di¤erentiable, its rst order condition
always identies costs (given bi; there is a unique value for ci that solves (5)). Thus Bi2 = ;.
By contrast, we will see below that Bi2 is not necessarily empty in the combinatorial rst
price auction. In addition, equilibrium strategies in the independent private values single
object rst price auction are strictly increasing . Hence (Bi3) = 0 (which follows from the
fact that the bidders optimization problem is a.e. di¤erentiable) implies i(Bi3) = 0:
Putting both elements together yields i(Bi1) = 1 : the model is identied on the basis
of the rst order conditions. But notice that, on the way, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong have
relied on some knowledge about the nature of equilibrium in the auction.
The next Lemma provides the needed equilibrium characterization results for the com-
binatorial rst price auction. In particular, it establishes that i(Bi3) = 0 too in the
combinatorial rst price auction.
Lemma 1 Consider the private value combinatorial rst auction model described in Section
2, without a reserve price or with a known reserve price, and with or without combination
bid constraints. Then, in any equilibrium where bidders bid on or above their costs:
(1) Bidders are indi¤erent about the way in which ties that occur with positive probability
are resolved,
(2) limb!b
P
sS(bs   cis)Gs(b) =
P
sS(b

s   cis)Gs(b) for all b 2 Bi; such that b is
bidder is optimal bid given costs ci:
(3) i(Bi3) = 0 for all i:
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix. Part 1 of Lemma 1 ensures that an
equilibrium exists with the London bus routes tie-breaking rule. Part 2 of Lemma 1 says that
biddersexpected equilibrium payo¤ is continuous in their bids, at their equilibrium bids.
A (locally) monotone and continuous function is always left and right di¤erentiable. Thus,
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biddersexpected equilibrium payo¤s are left and right di¤erentiable at their equilibrium
bids. Probabilities of winning are in principle not left and right di¤erentiable at discontinuity
points. However, because bidders are indi¤erent among the ways in which those ties are
resolved, we can adopt without loss of generality the convention that one-sided derivatives
at such points equal their limits. Formally, suppose bi corresponds to a discontinuity
point of Gs with respect to bt: Then its left derivative with respect to bt at bi is dened
as @@btGs(b
i) = limbbi"bi lim"#0 Gs(bbit ";bbi t) Gs(bbi)" : Finally, part 3 establishes that there are
no mass point in the distribution of equilibrium bids at kinks in the objective function.10
As a consequence, we can ignore bids in Bi3 for identication purposes because they are
submitted by a zero measure of cost realizations.
3.2 Identication conditions
At any point where bidder is objective function is di¤erentiable, his optimal bid vector
must satisfy the rst order conditions:11
Gt(b
i) +
X
sS
(bis   cis)
@
@bt
Gs(b
i) = 0 t  S
or, in matrix notation:
rG(bi)[bi ci] =  G(bi) (6)
where the (2m   1) by (2m   1) matrix rG(bi) is dened by rGt;s(bi) = @@btGs(bi) for
s; t  S and G(bi) is a 2m   1 x 1 vector with Gs(bi) as components.
The rst order conditions dene a system of linear equations in the unknown costs, ci:
Identication of costs on the basis of the rst order conditions then reduces to the question
of existence and uniqueness of a solution to this system.
Lemma 2 (Su¢ cient condition for identication) A su¢ cient condition for identi-
cation in the combinatorial rst price auction is that rG(bi) is invertible for all i and all
equilibrium bids bi:
Proof. The rst order conditions in (6) dene a system of linear equations in the
unknown cost parameters (the [bi   ci] vector). The invertibility of matrix rG(bi) is a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for a unique solution ci = i(bi) 2 R2m 1: Thus Bi2 is
10The denition of mass points in multi-dimensions is a straightforward extension of their denition for
univariate distribution: i(:) is said to have a mass point at B  Bi if i(B) > 0 but (B) = 0:
11This is independent of whether the equilibrium is in pure or mixed strategies. Even if the equilibrium
is in mixed strategies, equilibrium bids must satisfy the rst order conditions for optimal bids.
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empty: Because i(Bi3) = 0 by Lemma 1, identication of the distribution of costs F follows
directly.
Note that Lemma 2 says that point identication of the cost vectors is a su¢ cient, but
not a necessary, condition for the identication of the distribution of costs. Indeed, under
some restrictive conditions like independence, multidimensional distributions can be identi-
ed from the observation of lower dimensional data (Berman, 1963). While the equilibrium
bids submitted by a bidder on the di¤erent contracts are unlikely to be independently
distributed, there is no known result conrming this.
The next lemma (proved in the Appendix) investigates the properties of matrix rG :
Lemma 3 (Properties of OG) Consider matrixrG(bi) (with elements dened by rGt;s(bi) =
@
@bt
Gs(b
i)) evaluated at any optimal bid vector bi by bidder i. Then:
(1) @@btGt(b
i)  0 for all t; and strictly so if Gt(bi) > 0.
(2) @@btGs(b
i)  0 for all t 6= s:
(3)
P
sS
@
@bt
Gs(b
i)  0 for all t; and strictly so for some t if there exists s  S such
that Gs(bi) > 0.
(4) rG(bi) is invertible if Gs(bi) > 0 for all s:
(5) The determinant of any submatrix made from removing some rows and the corre-
sponding columns of rG has sign (-1)r where r is the number of remaining rows/columns if
all bid components in bi except those removed have a strictly positive probability of winning.
Note: Lemma 3 also applies to the Jacobian matrix of the probabilities of winning for the
optimization problem where bidder i is constrained to bid only on a subset K  2S of the
contracts; instead of all 2m   1 contracts.
The rst two properties say that the probability of winning a given route cannot increase
when the bidder increases his bid on that route, while the probability of winning any other
route cannot decrease. Combining these two properties implies that, when a bidder wins a
route with strictly positive probability, increasing his bid on this route must strictly decrease
his probability of winning that route. Otherwise, increasing his bid on that route would
constitute a protable deviation, violating the assumption that bi is an optimal bid.
Property 3 says that when a bidder increases one of his bids, his probability of winning
anything cannot increase. Moreover, if he is winning at least one route with strictly positive
probability at bi; his probability of winning anything must be strictly decreasing. (Again,
otherwise, he would have a protable deviation.)
17
Finally, property 4 relies on properties 1, 2 and 3, and on the property shown in the
Appendix that, at the optimum, bids with a strictly positive probability of winning compete
with one another.
From Lemma 3, rG is invertible when all bids have a strictly positive probability of
winning. However, not all equilibrium bids need to satisfy this condition. Irrelevant bids
(bids that never win) can be optimal from a bidders perspective because of the strategic
price discrimination motivation for combination bids: submitting a bid that never wins on
a contract ensures that this bid does not compete with a potentially more protable bid.12
Such bids are problematic for identication. Formally, bid bis is irrelevant if Gs(b
i
s;b
i s)
= 0 and there exists " > 0 such that Gs(bis   ";bi s) = 0 (bi s denotes bidder is bids
on the other contracts but s): Suppose bidder i submitted an irrelevant bid on contract s:
Then, any alternative bid vector (bbis;bi s) with bbis > bis would have been equally optimal for
bidder i; and therefore equally informative. More formally, @@bsGt(b
i) = 0 (small changes
in bis do not a¤ect the probability that bidder i wins contract s or any other contracts) and
@
@bt
Gs(b
i) = 0 for all t. The row and column corresponding to contract s in matrix rG
are all zeros. Therefore rG cannot be inverted and the condition in Lemma 2 fails.
To investigate identication in the presence of irrelevant bids, suppose that, at equi-
librium, bidder i submitted a bid with a strictly positive probability of winning on all
contracts in K  2S : Let biK denote his bid vector on contracts in K and dene by ciK the
corresponding subvector of costs. Consider the following alternative optimization problem:
bi(ci) = max
biK
X
s2K
(bis   cis) bGs(biK) (P2)
where bGs(:) = Gs(:; bit = 1; t =2 K). Because (P2) is a constrained version of (P1),bi(ci)  i(ci) for all ci: The two expressions are equal if the optimal bid in (P1) is such
that bidder i only wins contracts in K with strictly positive probability. When this is
the case, the solutions to the two problems coincide and the rst order conditions of (P2)
describe equally well the optimal bids:
bGw(biK) +X
s2K
(bis   cs)
@
@bw
bGs(biK) = 0 w 2 K (7)
This jKj dimensional system of linear equations can again be written in matrix notation:
r bG(biK)[biK ciK ] =   bG(biK): By Lemma 3, matrix r bG(biK) is invertible. Therefore,
costs ciK are identied:
ciK = b
i
K +r bG(biK) 1 bG(biK) (8)
12Armstrong (1996) provides a decision-theoretic example where this property holds at the optimum.
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Irrelevant bids do not a¤ect the identication of the costs of the other bids. This is somewhat
remarkable in this multi-unit auction setting where costs are a priori jointly determined as
the solution to a system of equations. The reason is that, in the case of irrelevant bids, bids
on other contracts do not a¤ect the probability that bidder i wins the contract on which
he submitted an irrelevant bid (it remains zero). Likewise, irrelevant bids do not a¤ect the
probability of winning any of the other contracts. This removes the interdependency among
the rst order conditions.
Now consider s =2 K: Let bis(bi s) be the threshold for bis over which it becomes irrelevant
that is:
b
i
s(b
i
 s) = inffbis : bis is irrelevant given bi sg
(b
i
s(b
i s) is a function of bidder is bids on the other contracts as well as the support of
competitorsbids.) Since expected prot is continuous, it must be that the slope of bidder
is expected prot to the left of b
i
s(b
i s) is positive. Formally,
lim
bs"bis
Gs(bs;b
i
 s) +
X
t2K
(bit   cit)
@
@bs
Gt(b
i
s;b
i
 s) + (b
i
s   cis)
@
@bs
Gs(b
i
s;b
i
 s)  0 (9)
where the derivatives are all left derivatives.1314 Given (8), cit; t 2 K; are point identied.
Thus, the only unknown in (9) is cis: Because
@
@bs
Gs < 0; (9) identies a lower bound to
the cost cis; c
i
s. Repeating this procedure for every irrelevant bid in b
i and combining with
(8) for the other bids, identies a lower bound, ci; to the true cost vector ci : ci  ci (in
the component-wise order). Let i(:) the function that associates bidder is equilibrium bid
vectors to the lower bound cost vector that rationalizes them, i.e. ci = (bi): We have
FiH(c) = 
i(fbi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2 : (bi)  cg):
Likewise, we can dene an upper bound on the costs that rationalize the observed bids.
Let cis = c
i
s if bidder is cost on contract s is point identied. Let c
i
s = 1 otherwise. Let

i
(bi) = ci; and dene FiL(c) = i(fbi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2 : (bi)  cg).
The next Theorem summarizes the results thus far:
Theorem 1 (Identication and partial identication) (i) Consider any bid bi 2 Bi1[
Bi2: If Gs(bi) > 0; then cis is point identied. Otherwise, cis  cis; where cis is dened by
(9).
13 In (9), the sum is only over t 2 K because @
@bs
Gw(b
i) = 0 for any w =2 K and w 6= s:
14The rst term in (9) takes into account that Gs may be discontinuous at b
i
s: In that case, see the
discussion after Lemma 1 for the construction of the left derivatives.
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(ii) If all equilibrium bids have a strictly positive probability of winning, the combinatorial
rst price model is identied. If equilibrium strategies contain bids that have zero probability
of winning, the model is partially identied. Any Fi such that FiH(c)  Fi(c)  FiL(c) for
all c (FiH and FiL dened in the text) is consistent with the observed equilibrium.
Proof. We rst consider the identication of the set of costs associated with each
equilibrium bid bi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2. Suppose that Gs(bi) > 0 for all s: From Lemma 3(4),
the Jacobian matix rG is invertible, and Lemma 2 implies that the costs rationalizing bi
are uniquely determined. Suppose now that Gs(bi) = 0 for some s which means that bi
includes an irrelevant bid. Irrelevant bids correspond to bids in Bi2 for which the arguments
around (8) and (9) establish bounds on their associated costs. This establishes (i) and pins
down the correspondence i : Bi1 [ Bi2  R2m 1:
We now turn to the question of the identication of Fi: By Lemma 1(3), we can without
loss of generality focus on bids in Bi1 [ Bi2 because bids in Bi3 are submitted by a zero
measure of costs. When Gs(bi) > 0 for all s; for all bi in Bi1 [ Bi2 and for all i; i
is a function for all i and identication of Fi follows from Lemma 2. Otherwise, two
selections of i of interest are its minimum selection, i(:); and its maximum selection,

i
(:). They generate FiH and FiL dened as FiH(c) = i(fbi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2 : (bi)  cg) and
FiL(c) = 
i(fbi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2 : (bi)  cg) for c 2 R2m 1: Because cost ranges are identied,
any Fi 2 F such that FiH  Fi  FiL is consistent with the observed equilibrium.
Theorem 1 provides a partial identication result when equilibrium behavior involves
irrelevant bids. Given the results in Armstrong (1996), this is likely to be a generic case.
Nevertheless, partial identication results can be used for answering policy questions by
estimating policy variables for all cost distributions in the set of cost distributions consistent
with equilibrium behavior. Moreover, bounds on policy variables of interest are often all
we are interested in. The bounds derived in Theorem 1 allow us to compute bounds on the
expected procurement cost in a Vickrey auction or in any other auction where bid functions
are monotonic in costs.15 Note that the bounds on the distribution of costs are essentially
sharp in the sense that FiH and FiL correspond - modulo a slight pertubation to ensure
a continuous density - to feasible cost distributions that is consistent with the observed
equilibrium bids.
15The condition needed here is that the policy variable be monotonic in some (partial) order of the elements
of the set. See Manski and Tamer (2002) for related results in the presence of partial identication. For
another example where the bounds on primitives are directly useful to compute bounds on policy variables
in auctions, see Haile and Tamer (2003).
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An interpretation of Theorem 1 is that identication requires the dimensionality of the
observed information to match that of the information to infer. The set of bids that have
a strictly positive probability of winning determines the dimensionality of the observed
information. Any irrelevant bid introduces a dimension of under-identication, and it is at
the source of the partial identication result of Theorem 1. Pursuing on this intuition, we
can easily prove the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 The multi-unit rst price auction model is not identied if only stand-alone
bids are permitted (i.e. bi 2 Rm):
The multi-unit rst price auction model is identied if the following two conditions hold:
(i) costs are additive, i.e. cs[s0 = cs + cs0 for all s; s0  S with s \ s0 = ?.
(ii) all stand-alone bids have a strictly positive probability of winning, i.e., Gs(bi) > 0 for
s 2 S
These two conditions will be satised if bidderssupports of cost realizations have the same
upper bound and there is no reserve price.
The intuition is straightforward. In the multi-unit auction model, the underlying private
information to infer (the costs cs) is 2m   1 dimensional. When only stand-alone bids are
permitted, the observed information is at most m dimensional. So, there is no hope to infer
costs, unless the dimensionality of private information is also m (note that additive costs
are ruled out by assumption 1).
Proof. When bids are only permitted on individual routes, the auction e¤ectively
become m independent single object rst price auctions. The necessary conditions for
optimal bids are the m rst order conditions. This is a system of m linear equations in
2m   1 variables (the unobserved ciw). This system is under-identied. Thus costs are not
identied and as a result the model is not identied.
When costs are additive, identication follows from the arguments in Guerre, Perrigne and
Vuong (2000) Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) and Athey and Haile (2005) applied to
the m independent auctions. The conditions of same upper bound to cost realizations and
no reserve price guarantee all equilibrium bids have a strictly positive probability of winning
and the model is identied through the rst order conditions.
3.3 Other constraints on bidding behavior
Most real-life multi-unit auctions include various restrictions on the set of allowable bids
which may further reduce the dimensionality of the observed information. In this section,
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we show how to extend our identication results and derive identication bounds on the
costs and distributions of costs in these cases. We illustrate our approach by considering two
types of restrictions present in our data. First, the rule of the auction imposes that bids on
a combination of routes must be no greater than the sum of the constituent bids. Second,
London Transport Buses imposes a reserve price. Bidders are not obliged to submit bids
on all routes and some bidders indeed submit bids only on a subset of the routes auctioned.
Our interpretation is that it was not protable for these bidders to submit a bid that would
have had a positive chance of winning.
We rst consider the combination bid constraint. In the presence of combination bid
constraints, the biddersoptimization problem becomes:
max
bi
X
sS
(bis   cs)Gs(bi)
subject to:
bis  biw + bit for all s; t; w  S such that t \ w = ; and t [ w = s
This optimization is di¤erentiable almost everywhere (and continuous at all optimal bids
from Lemma 1). Its rst order conditions are given by
Gt(b
i) +
X
sS
(bis   cis)Gts(bi) 
X
r;wS
t=r[w +
X
s;rS
s=r[t = 0 8t  S
where t=r[w is the multiplier of the constraint bit  bir+ biw (t=r[w  0). We dene a new
column vector D(bi;) with component Dt(bi;) =  Gt(bi) 
P
s;r s=r[t+
P
r;w t=r[w:
The rst order conditions can then be rewritten as
rG(bi)(bi   ci) = D(bi;)
Lemma 3 applies to matrix rG (with the convention that where a combination bid con-
straint binds, the one-sided derivative that satises the constraint is used). If all bids have
a strictly positive probability of winning, rG can be inverted and ci solves
ci = bi  rG(bi) 1D(bi;) (10)
If a subset of the equilibrium bids are irrelevant, rG cannot be inverted. In that case, we
can proceed as before by considering the alternative optimization problem where bidder i
only bids on the contracts K  2S for which he submitted a bid with a strictly positive
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probability of winning in the original problem:
bi(ci) = max
biK
X
s2K
(bis   cis) bGs(biK)
s.t. bis  biw + bit for all s; t; w 2 K such that t \ w = ; and t [ w = s
The associated jKj by jKj matrix r bGs(biK) satises the conditions of Lemma 3(4) and is
therefore invertible, yielding:
ciK = b
i
K  r bG(biK) 1D(biK ;) (11)
A direct consequence of expressions (10) and (11) is that the costs of the contracts which
bidder i wins with strictly positive probability at equilibrium are uniquely identied up
to the value of the multiplier : If no constraint binds so that all multipliers are equal to
zero, the costs are point identied. When any of the constraints binds, bounds on each
cost can be constructed from (11) by exploiting the fact that the multipliers on the binding
constraints are all positive. Formally, let
cis = sup
0
fcomponent s of vector biK  r bG(biK) 1D(biK ;)g (12)
cis = inf
0
fcomponent s of vector biK  r bG(biK) 1D(biK ;)g (13)
We thus have: ciK  ciK  ciK :
We now turn to reserve prices. When the auction includes reserve prices but no com-
bination bid constraint, the formal treatment of non submitted bids is exactly the same as
that of irrelevant bids, except for the fact that the threshold for irrelevant bids is replaced
by:
b
i
s(b
i
 s) = minfRs; inffbis : bis is irrelevant given bi sgg
where Rs is the known reserve price on s: Costs associated with bids that have a strictly
positive probability of winning are point identied following (8). Costs associated with
irrelevant bids or non submitted bids are partially identied based on (9) using the new
denition of b
i
s(b
i s) above.
When the auction includes a reserve price and a combination bid constraint, a binding
reserve price does not always identify a lower bound to the associated cost. To get some
intuition for this result, consider the following two-route auction. Suppose bidder i only
submitted a bid on route 1. Using the earlier results, we can point identify ci1 and place
a lower bound on c12: However, bidder is bidding behavior does not place a lower bound
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on c2 if bi1 +R2 < R12. By not submitting a bid that has a positive probability of winning
on route 2, bidder i also ensures that he will never win both routes. This could be a best
response if c12 is very large.
Theorem 2 summarizes what can be identied in the presence of combination bid con-
straints and reserve prices.
Theorem 2 (Partial identication with reserve prices and/or combination bid constraints)
Consider the combinatorial rst price auction model with reserve prices and, possibly, a
combination bid constraint.
(1) Identication of costs. Consider any equilibrium bid vector bi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2:
(i) Suppose Gs(bi) > 0 for some s  S; then upper and lower bounds to cis are identied
following (12) and (13). In particular, if Gs(bi) > 0 for all s  S and bi satises strictly
all combination bid constraints (if any applies), then ci is point identied.
(ii) Suppose Gs(bi) = 0 for some s  S and the auction does not have a combination
bid constraint. Then a lower bound to cis; c
i
s; is identied following (9). If b
i
s(b
i s) = Rs
then cis = Rs:
(iii) Suppose Gs(bi) = 0 for some s  S and the auction has a combination bid
constraint. Then a lower bound to cis; c
i
s; is identied following (9) if Gt(b
i) > 0 or
Gt(b
i
s(b
i s);bi s) = 0 for all t  s: No bound is identied otherwise.
(2) (Partial) Identication of the distributions of costs. For all i; let i(:) :
Bi1 [ Bi2  R2m 1 dene the mapping from bidder is equilibrium bids to the set of costs
(obtained from the application of (1)) that are consistent with them. Any Fi 2 F such that
F i(c) = i(fbi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2 : ei(bi)  cg) for some selection ei of i; is consistent with the
observed equilibrium.
Part (1) of Theorem 2 follows from the arguments in the text above, except for the claim
that cis = Rs; which is proved in the Appendix. Part (1) identies costs or cost ranges for
bids that correspond to Bi1 and Bi2: Part (2) follows from part (1) given that bids in Bi3
are submitted by a zero measure of costs.
In some cases, the value of  that solves for the bounds in (12) and (13) can be known
a priori. The next Theorem characterizes this value of :
Theorem 3 Consider any optimal bid bi :
(1) For any s such that Gs(bi) > 0, cis depends positively on the value of s=t[w; and
negatively on t=s[w for all t and w:
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(2) Consider any t, w  S such that t \ w = ;: If the combination bid constraint for these
contracts is the only binding combination bid constraint at bi; an upper bound to the synergy
involved between these two contracts is given by the solution ct+ cw   ct[w of the system in
(11) when the Lagrangian multiplier ft[wg=t[w = 0.
Theorem 3 uses Cramers rule and the properties of the determinants to sign how the
solution in (10) and (11) depends on the value of the multiplier. Theorem 3 is silent
concerning how cis depends on r=t[w for r; t; w 6= s: This relationship cannot be signed on
a systematic basis. Instead, (12) and (13) should be used.
Note that, in principle, we could have generated a lower and upper bound FiL and FiH
to the distribution consistent with the observed bid distribution. However, a consequence
of Theorem 3 is that such FiL and FiH would never be sharp in the presence of a combi-
nation bid constraint, unlike the bounds on the distributions of costs derived in Theorem
1. Because the bounds on costs for di¤erent contracts correspond to di¤erent values of
the multipliers, they do not correspond to a cost realization consistent with the observed
bid. Thus, the upper and lower bounds on the cost distributions do not rationalize the
observed bid distribution. As a result, they are less useful for policy analysis. The whole
set of identied distributions rather than the bounds themselves should be used for such
purposes.
4 The London Bus Market
This section describes the London bus market, gives descriptive summaries of our data and
motivates the empirical specication described in section 6.
The London bus market represents about 800 routes serving an area of 1,630 square
kilometers and more than 3.5 million passengers per day. It is valued at 600 million Pounds
per year (US $1,100 million). Deregulation was introduced by the London Regional Trans-
port Act of 1984. The Transport Act designated London Regional Transport (LRT) as the
authority responsible for the provision and procurement of public transport services in the
Greater London area, as well as the development and operations of bus stations and the
network-wide operational maintenance. Private procurement was encouraged. In order to
enhance competition, LRT, which by virtue of the Transport Act acted as the holding com-
pany for the original public operator London Buses Limited, created a separate tendering
division, independent from its operational division, and split the formerly unitary London
Buses into 12 operational subsidiairies. These were privatized in 1994. In practice, the
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introduction of route tendering was very gradual. The rst tenders took place in 1985, but
it was not until 1995 that half of the network was tendered at least once.16 Since then,
tendering has reached its steady state regime with 15-20% of the network tendered every
year.
The procurement process. About every two weeks London Transport Buses issues an
invitation to tender which provides a detailed description of upcoming contracts for sale.
The invitation simultaneously covers several routes, usually in the same area of London. For
each route, the invitation provides a complete description of the service for tender including
the routing, service frequency and vehicle type. Contract length is typically ve years. A set
of pre-qualied bidders may submit sealed bids for individual routes. In addition, bidders
may submit a bid for route combinations within the auction. A bid species an annual price
at which the bidder is willing to provide the service.17 There is a period of two months
between the invitation to tender and the tender return date, and another two months before
contracts are awarded. The o¢ cial award criterion is best economic value and the process
follows EU law for fair competition. In practice, this means that the contract is awarded
to the low bidder but deviations at the margin are possible to account for bidder quality
for instance.18 To allow winning bidders to reorganize and order new buses if necessary,
contracts start 8 to 10 months after the award date.
Description of the bid data.19 We have collected data on 179 auctions consisting of a
total of 674 routes o¤ered to bidders between December 1995 and May 2001 (return date).
For each auction and for each route in the auction, the data include the following infor-
mation: (1) contract duration and planned start of the contract (2) route characteristics
including the route start and end points; route type (day route, night route, school service,
16Non-tendered routes remained operated by the subsidiaries of London Buses Limited under a negotiated
block grant. The private operators and the subsidiaries competed for the tendered services.
17London Transport Buses has experimented with di¤erent contractual forms. The majority of contracts
are so called gross cost contracts, in which the revenues collected on the buses accrue to London Transport
Buses and the operator receives a xed fee for the service. Some contracts are net cost contracts, in which
the operators take responsibility for the revenues. The price for the operator service then consists of those
revenues plus a transfer from (or payment to) London Transport Buses. Finally, net cost contracts may
contain a provision that limits the risk the operator takes in case the revenues were too di¤erent from the
forecast. If bidders are risk neutral, which we assume in our analysis, all three contracts forms are equivalent.
18From the 118 auctions studied in the empirical analysis, a deviation at the margin for some route occurs
on 39 auctions. The empirical analysis revealed no systematic patterns in these considerations that we could
model explicitly. We interpret the considerations at the margin as noise in the awarding process.
19Appendix A provides further details concerning the sources of the data.
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mobility route); annual mileage; bus type (single deck, midibuses, double deck or routemas-
ter); and the peak vehicle requirement;20 (3) the identity of bidders and all their submitted
bids (including bids for combinations of the routes in the auction). For the auctions held
starting in May 2000, the data also contain an internal cost estimate generated by London
Transport Buses for every route. All price data are expressed in December 1995 Pounds.
Contract heterogeneity. There are many dimensions along which the routes in our sample
vary. Route characteristics a¤ect costs and, ultimately, participation and bids. A monetary
measure of contract heterogeneity is the internal cost estimate (ICE) prepared by London
Transport Buses since May 2000. We generated a predicted internal cost estimate based
on a regression of the ICE on route characteristics.21 We found the predicted ICE to be
an accurate assessment of the nal cost. We considered a regression of the log of bids and
the log of low bids on the log of the internal cost estimate. The log internal cost estimate
explains 93% of the variation in the log bids. In order keep the number of explanatory
variables in our empirical specication small, we use the predicted internal cost estimate to
account for contract heterogeneity.
Most auctions consist of only few routes.22 Our estimation uses the 118 auctions in our
data that have no more than 3 routes. Table 1 provides summary statistics of our bid data
for these auctions.23
Table 1 Descriptive Summary of the Bid Data (Auctions with 1, 2 and 3 routes)
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max
ln(ICE) 218 13.28 1.29 10.82 15.56
Number-of-Actual-Bidders-per-Auction 118 3.70 1.74 1 8
Number-of-Actual-Bidders-per-Route 218 2.94 1.57 1 7
Log-Stand-Alone-Bid 641 13.12 1.28 9.47 15.87
Log-Combination-Bid 83 14.48 0.74 11.75 15.89
Money-Left-on-Table (%) 177 13.54 20.36 0.06 157.86
20The peak vehicle requirement determines how many buses the winning operator needs to commit to the
contract.
21The route characteristics include the peak vehicle requirement, annual mileage for central London routes
and annual mileage for non-central London routes interacted with bus type dummies (single deck or midibus,
double deck or route master).
22The distribution of routes across tranches in our sample is the following: 50 tranches consist of a single
route, 36 tranches have two routes, 32 tranches have 3 routes, 13 tranches have 4 routes, 10 have 5 routes,
27 tranches have between 6 and 10 routes, and 11 tranches have more than 10 routes.
23The equivalent statistics for the whole sample are very similar.
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On average 3.7 bidders submit at least one bid on an auction. The number of bidders
ranges between 1 and 8. Fewer bids are submitted on individual routes. On average 2.94
bidders submit a bid for an individual route. The number of bids per route ranges between
1 and 7. A total of 44 bidders submit at least one bid on an auction with three routes or
less. Of those, 26 win a contract.
Bidders submit a total of 641 stand-alone bids. The distribution of normalized stand-
alone bids resembles a log-normal distribution. The average stand-alone bid equals 13.1 in
logarithm which amounts to about 490,000 Pounds. Since bidders are committed by their
bids, stand-alone bids dene implicitly a combination bid (with value equal to the sum of
the stand-alone bids). We call a combination bid non trivialwhen it is strictly less than
the sum of the component stand-alone bids. On the auctions with two and three routes a
total of 83 non trivial combination bids and 218 trivial combination bids are submitted.24
Reasons invoked by the bidders to o¤er discounts for combinations of routes include the
possibility to share spare vehicles and garage overhead costs in general, and more e¢ cient
organization and coordination of working schedules. Ignoring trivial combination bids, the
discount of a combination bid relative to the sum of stand-alone bids by the same company
equals 4.5% on average. The discount amounts to 3.9% with two-route bids, 7.7% with
3-route bids. When all combination bids are included (i.e. those implicitly dened by
stand-alone bids), this discount drops to 1.1% on average (1% for two-route bids and 1.6%
for 3-route-bids).
The market for bus operators. We denote as a bidderany bus operator that is active
in the tendered bus services within the local areas of London. As of November 2000, there
were 51 independent pre-qualied bidders in the market. After the privatization of the
London Buses subsidiaries in 1994, a substantial reorganization and consolidation of the
industry took place. Since then, the market has stabilized with a C4 ratio around 70%
between late 1996 and 2001.
For each bidder active in the tendered bus services in London, we have a complete history
of its garages (openings/rst time use for the tendered market and closings, location) since
deregulation, as well as its committed eet for the tendered market on a monthly basis.
24A trivial combination bid is generated for each non overlapping combination of routes s and t over which
a bidder bid without submitting a bid on route combination s [ t:
The following calculation provides a sense of the censoring present in our data due to the reserve price
and the combination bid constraint imposed by LTB. If all bidders who ever submitted a bid on a route in
a tranche had submitted a bid on all the routes and route combinations in the tranche, we would have 852
stand-alone and 693 combination bids.
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Garages are leased on a long term basis or bought, and a typical garage has capacity for
50-100 buses and serves about 8 routes.
A few elements are worth noting. First, asymmetry among bidders is considerable. The
average bidder has about four garages in London but the number of garages ranges between
0 and 21 across bidders. For example, in November 2000, a total of 10 bidders had one
garage, 4 bidders had two garages, one bidder had 6 garages, one bidder has 7 garages,
one bidder had 9 garages, one bidder had 11 garages, one bidder have 13 garages, and one
bidder has 21 garages. This size asymmetry is also reected in the distribution of market
shares in our sample.
Second, despite a fairly concentrated market, an active fringe of small bidders seems to
be providing a certain level of competition. For our whole sample, entrants, i.e. bidders
without an established garage at the time of the auction, submitted 10.6% of all the bids,
and bidders with only one established garage submitted another 15.95% of the bids. In our
sample, there was an entrant or a bidder with only one garage bidding on 49.11% of the
routes. Such active fringe would make collusion very di¢ cult to sustain.
Money left on the table and bidder participation. A measure of money left on the
table is the relative di¤erence between the lowest and second lowest stand-alone bid. Table
1 reveals that the money left on the table equals 13.54%. Thus, stand-alone bids overpay
by about 110,500 Pounds on average. This suggests that the winning bidder does not know
the competitorsbids and is uncertain about the competitorsbid levels.25
What determines uncertainty in bids? At the bidder level, costs are determined in part
by the actual expenses in capital, labor and fuel incurred in carrying out the contract. But
they also depend on the opportunity of using these resources, especially capital, in other
ways. There is probably little uncertainty among bidders concerning the expected cost of
labor or fuel (there are well functioning markets for these), but opportunity costs may not
be known to other bidders. Our interpretation is that uncertainty in this market is best
viewed as stemming from private information about (opportunity) costs.
An important question for modelling bidding behavior in the London bus routes market
is to determine whether cost uncertainty arises at the rm, auction, or route level. In other
words, does the opportunity cost vary at the rm level, the garage level or route level? To
25As the number of bidders increases, the amount overpaid decreases. The money left on the table
equals 20.94% when two bids are submitted, 11.51% when three bids are submitted, 9.36% when four bids
are submitted and 7.69% when ve or more bids are submitted. Even so, with ve or more bidders the
amount overpaidfor the average contract equals almost 63,000 Pounds.
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examine these questions we decompose the variation in the bid submission decision.
In the next paragraphs, we examine how much of the variation in the decision variable
is explained by auction xed e¤ects, route xed e¤ects, auction-garage and auction-bidder
xed e¤ects, as well as dead mileage (closest distance from the route to the garage). We
focus on bid submission decisions by bidders with an active garage at the time of the auction
and on auctions of two and three routes. We are left with 3,358 observations. Due to the
large number of explanatory variables, we consider the linear probability model and estimate
it using OLS. The empirical model is y = X + u; where y = 1 if a bid is submitted and
zero otherwise, X denotes a vector of explanatory variables and u denotes the residual.
Table 2 reports our results for several specications. The individual specications grad-
ually add more variables to X. A description of these is given in the second column, and
their number is given in the third column. The fourth and fth columns report the R2 and
adjusted R
2
for the specication. We interpret the increase in the fraction of explained
variance as a measure of the importance of the added variables. The last column reports
the value of the F - statistic for the test of joint signicance of the explanatory variables
added relative to the previous model. For example, the test statistic for the hypothesis that
auction xed e¤ects are zero (model (2)) is an F - distributed random variable with (67,
3288) degrees of freedom.
Table 2 Variance Decomposition of the Bid Submission Decision
Variables Included #var R2 R
2
F
(1) Dead Mileage, linear and quadratic (DM) 3 0.24 0.24 520.75
(2) DM+Auction Fixed E¤ects (AF) 70 0.28 0.27 3.00
(2) DM+Route Fixed E¤ects 170 0.30 0.26 1.63
(3) DM+AF+ Operator Fixed E¤ects 92 0.31 0.29 4.14
(4) DM+AF+Depot Fixed E¤ects 159 0.40 0.37 6.83
 Auctions with 2 and 3 routes.  indicates signicance at 1% level.
Models (2) and (2) test competing interpretation of the sources of uncertainty common
to all bidders: at the auction or at the route level. Model (2) does somewhat worse on
the basis of the adjusted R
2
than model (2) suggesting that there may be little common
shocks to bidders at the route level. We tested the null that route xed e¤ects are zero when
auction xed e¤ects are present. The test statistic is an F - distributed random variable with
(100, 3188) degrees of freedom. It is equal to 0.73. We cannot reject the null hypothesis
that route xed e¤ects are zero once auction xed e¤ects are accounted for. We conclude
that there are no route level shocks common to all bidders. For this reason, models (3) and
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(4) build on model (2).
According to the R2 in model (4) about 60% of the variation remains unexplained. The
unexplained part comes from the remaining uncertainty as to whether a bidder submits a
bid on a given route after controlling for dead mileage, garage xed e¤ects and auction xed
e¤ects. We may interpret this uncertainty as a bidder specic idiosyncracy arising at the
route and auction level. Notice also, that the order in which we add variables may a¤ect
the contribution to the R2. We looked at permutations of the order and found no major
di¤erences.
The empirical evidence suggests the following origins for the cost uncertainty: First,
there is no evidence of cost shocks common to all bidders at the route level after controlling
for auction xed e¤ects since route xed e¤ects are not signicant. Second, a substantial
part of the uncertainty in biddersdecisions is explained by bidder asymmetry captured
by dead mileage, bidder xed e¤ects and garage xed e¤ects. Third, there is considerable
residual uncertainty for each bidder arising at the route and auction level.
Summary and conclusions. The evidence presented in this section supports the view
that a multi-unit combinatorial rst price auction with private values and multi-dimensional
private information is a reasonable model for the London bus routes market. We argue these
points in turn.
Multi-unit combinatorial : The auction appears the proper level of analysis for this
market. First, the temporal simultaneity of the auction for the routes in the same auction,
their geographic proximity as well as the existence of combination bids requires that we
analyze them at the same time. Second, several elements suggest that inter-auction e¤ects
may not be very important. The delay of 10 months between the award date and the start of
the contract reduces the role for capacity in this market. In addition, combination bidding
is motivated in part by (local) cost synergies among routes, but di¤erent auctions tend
to cover di¤erent geographical areas. The geographic dispersion of the auctions together
with local nature of the business reduces the interactions among auctions and bidders. We
calculated that an average bidder in our sample bid on an auction every 5 months only.
Private Values: Most of the inputs used by bidders have well-functioning markets. In
addition, our bidders are experienced so we expect them to be able to forecast accurately
their costs, in the sense that cost forecasts by competitors should not lead to revise their
own cost estimates. Finally, the fact that we did not nd evidence of common shocks at
the route level lends further support to this hypothesis.
Multi-dimensional private information: Our specication is exible. It allows for cost
31
correlation across routes, but does not assume it. This exibility seems important in view
of the evidence presented in table 2.
5 Estimation Method
This section describes our estimation approach and illustrates its implementation in prac-
tice.
Our estimation approach consists of two steps: In the rst step, the bid density is
estimated and the implied probability of winning is obtained. In the second step, we use the
results of section 3 to infer costs or cost ranges that rationalize the observed bids. Section
5.1 describes the details of our parametric specication of the bid density which takes
into account bidder and contract specic covariates. Section 5.2 describes the estimation
procedure to infer the parameters of the bid density. Section 5.3 takes the bid density
function as given and describes our method to infer costs.
As described in section 3, we observe data on a cross section of auctions t = 1; : : : T .
Let bit denote the bid vector of bidder i submitted for the contracts in auction t. Let
Xt = (xt;w1t; : : : ;wNt) denote the contract and bidder characteristics of auction t and
Xts denote the subset of characteristics relevant for contract s in auction t. Let w
 i;t
denote the vector of characteristics for bidders other than bidder i. We sometimes also
write Xit = (xt;wit;w i;t), where superscript i indicates that bidder characteristics are
evaluated from bidder is perspective.
Assumption 1 in section 2 implies that bidder is bid vector in auction t is stochasti-
cally independent from bidder js bid vector, conditional on observable characteristics. We
assume that characteristics Xt are observable to all bidders and the econometrician. We do
not consider bidder or contract heterogeneity that is not observed to the econometrician.
Unobserved contract heterogeneity in single unit auctions is studied in Krasnokutskaya
(2004). Finally, if there are multiple equilibria, we assume that our data are generated by
a single equilibrium selection.
5.1 Bid Density Function
This section describes our specication of the bid density function.
As proposed in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), non-parametric techniques can be
used to estimate the bid distribution. Non-parametric estimators permit exibility in the
shape of the bid distribution but, at the same time, require many data points to obtain
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precise estimates. The data requirement increases quickly with the dimensionality of the
distribution, as is illustrated in Silvermann (1986). Our bidding model is multi-dimensional
and the dimensionality increases further due to the combination bids. Since the size of our
data set is small, we consider a parametric specication instead.
Our parametric framework enables us to take covariates into account. In particular,
bidder heterogeneity is an important element of London bus auctions. We incorporate bidder
heterogeneity into the analysis in three ways: First, we account for e¢ ciency di¤erences
between bidders reected in bidder size and measured by the number of available garages.
Second, we take into account the locational specics of the market by measuring the distance
between the garage and the route26 to account for bidder specic transportation costs.
Third, we explicitly distinguish two types of bidders: regular and fringe. Regular bidders
have a garage within a eight mile radius of a route in the auction. Fringe bidders do
not have a garage yet, or their garage is further than eight miles away from any route in
the auction. Distinguishing between regular and fringe bidders allows us to account for
behavioral di¤erences between bidders that bid regularly and bidders that bid once on a
single contract or on few occasions only.
The statistical model for latent bids b by bidder i on auction t with mt routes is based
on a multi-variate normal density, (jXit;), with covariates Xit and parameter vector
 = (;). We assume that a logarithmic transformation of bids minus the logarithm of
the internal cost estimate, ICE, is distributed as follows:
ln(b)  ln(ICE) s (jXit;)
where  denotes a multi-variate normal density and the rst element of the parameter
vector, (Xit) denotes the (2m
t 1) dimensional vector of means of log bids and the second,

 
Xit

, is a (2m
t   1) by (2mt   1) covariance matrix. We assume that the mean s is a
linear function of characteristics,
s(X
it) = s Xit,
where the variables in Xit include bidder is closest distance from the garage to the start
(or ending) point of route (combination) s  St measured in logs, the logarithm of the
number of garages of bidder i and an indicator variable that equals one if the bidder is a
fringe bidder.
26The distance of a bidder to a route is dened as the minimum distance between the route start (or end)
point and any garage of the bidder.
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Three restrictions on bids characterize the boundaries of the bid support: First, latent
bids for a combination of items that are greater than the sum of constituent bids are not
observed. Second, a stand-alone bid that is larger than a combination bids involving the
stand-alone contract is not observed. Third, latent bids above the reserve price supremum
are not observed. As in La¤ont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), we can incorporate the bid
restrictions by dening the observed bid as a function of the latent bid. Specically, we
dene the observed bid as equal to the supremum of reserve price, Rs, when the latent bid
is not observed. We dene the observed bid as equal to the sum of stand-alone bids if this
sum is less than the latent bid and if every constituent stand-alone bid in the sum is less
than its reserve price. We dene the observed constituent bid on a route (combination) as
equal to the combination bid involving that route if the latent constituent bid exceeds the
combination bid. Formally, we dene a mapping g = (g1; : : : ; gs; : : : ; gS)
0
that transforms
latent bids, b 2 <2m 1++ ; into observed bids, b 2<2
m 1
++ , that satisfy these constraints,
b = g(b;R). A typical component s  S of the mapping g is given by:
gs(b
;R) = min
 
Rs; min
s1;s2S;s1[s2=s;s1\s2=?;bs1Rs1 ;bs2Rs2
(bs; b

s1 + b

s2);mins0S
bs[s0
!
Henceforth, we use this convention and restrict attention to observed bids. Thus, the
support of observed bids by bidder i is given by
B = b 2 <2m 1++ bs  Rs; bs[s0  bs + bs0 ; and bs  bs[s0 for all s; s0  S with s 6= s0	 :
(14)
and we assume that the supremum of reserve prices are additive, Rs[s0 = Rs + Rs0 for all
s; s0  S with s 6= s0. Notice that all bids in the interior of the support B are relevant bids
as dened in section 3. Irrelevant bids may arise on the boundary of the bid support, for
example, when the constituent bid constraint, bs  bs[s0 , is binding.
The total number of bidders at an auction consists of regular and fringe bidders. The
set of regular bidders is described by our garage data which include detailed information on
all garage locations. The number of fringe bidders is not observed in the data and needs to
be estimated. The maximum number of fringe bidders submitting a bid equals three on any
auction. We use this number as an estimate for the potential number of fringe bidders. The
maximum number of fringe bidders is a supere¢ cient estimator as it converges at a rate
faster than our parameter estimates. Thus, the estimate of the number of fringe bidders
does not a¤ect the distribution of the remaining parameter estimates asymptotically.
Estimation: There is a large literature on estimation methods of the parameters of
a lognormal density function, see Gri¢ ths (1980). Proposed methods include maximum
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likelihood and the method of moments. Maximum likelihood yields consistent and e¢ -
cient estimates of the parameters (;) as the number of auctions T gets large. Yet, the
likelihood function involves multi-variate integrals. These integrals arise due to the combi-
nation, stand-alone and reserve price restriction. Numerical calculation of the integrals and
the likelihood function can be computationally intensive. The method of moments provides
an alternative estimation method to maximum likelihood that yields consistent estimates
as the number of auctions T increases, see Hansen (1982). Numerical calculation of the mo-
ment conditions can also be computationally intensive for a multi-variate truncated density.
However, simulation estimators (McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989)) provide
an elegant solution to this problem.27 The next section describes our simulated methods of
moment estimator for the density of bids.
5.2 A Simulated Method of Moments Estimator
We consider a method of moments estimator that is based on the moments of observed bids.
For computational reasons, we consider the logarithmic transformation of observed bids nor-
malized by the internal cost estimate, B = ln(b) ln(ICE). Let (B)1 = (B1; : : : ; BS) denote
the vector of rst moments of log normalized bids, (B)2 = ((B1B1); (B1B2) ; : : : ; (BSBS))
denote the vector of second moments of log normalized bids, and so on. Notice, that the
expected di¤erence between the observed and theoretical moment when evaluated at the
true parameter value 0 is zero:
E
h
(Bit)k   E
h
BkjXit; = 0
ii
= 0
Given this condition together with some standard regularity conditions, we can adopt the
method of moments estimator described in Hansen (1982). Unfortunately, E

BkjXit; is
the kth moment of a truncated multi-variate normal random variable, which is numerically
time-consuming to calculate. We solve the integration problem by replacing the di¢ cult to
calculate expected value with a simulated, unbiased estimate. To see this, notice that the
expected kth order moment of the observed bid can be written as
E
h
BkjXit;
i
=
Z
  
Z 
log(g(";Rt))k
("jXit;)
'(")

'(")d"1    d"St
by multiplying and dividing the integrand by the multi-variate importance function '(),
which we assume equal to the product of univariate normal densities, '(") = sSt ("s) and
27Methods based on simulating the likelihood function are less attractive because the simulation error
enters non-linearly and may bias the estimates.
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where  () denotes a univariate normal density with unit variance. The mapping g(";Rt)
normalizes bids by using the internal cost estimate and takes the reserve price, stand-alone
and combination bid restriction into account. So, a typical component of the mapping g is
given by gs(";R
t) = gs(exp(")  ICEt;Rt)=ICEts.
Given a xed set of L random draws, b" = b"1; : : : ;b"L, from the multi-variate impor-
tance function '() for each bidder and auction, we dene the estimate, cBk, for bidder i on
auction t as: cBk(Xit;;b"it) = 1
L
LX
l=1
"
log(g
b"itl;Rt)k(b"itljXit;)
'(b"itl)
#
Observe that the estimate cBk(Xit;;b"it) is continuously di¤erentiable in the parameter
vector  and it is an unbiased estimator of E

BkjXit;,
cBk(Xit;;b"it) = E hBkjXit;i+ bvk.
Under regularity conditions which are satised here, McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pol-
lard (1989) show that a method of moments technique is still appropriate to estimate 
when the estimate cBk replaces the theoretical analogue. We consider two sets of moment
conditions. First, the rst moment of observed bids:
M1 () =
X
i;t
X
sSt
h
Bits   cB1s (Xit;;b"it)i Wit1s
whereWit1s is a row vector of instruments for the rst moment of the normalized bid B
it
s .
The second set of moment conditions is based on the second moment of observed bids and
accounts for the correlation between (combination) bids:
M2 () =
X
i;t
X
s;s0St
h
(Bits Bits0 )  dB2ss0 (Xit;;b"it)i Wit2ss0
where Wit2
ss0 is a row vector of instruments for the second moment of the normalized bid
Bits Bits0 . The method of moment estimation technique is based on the restriction that the
moment condition is uncorrelated with the exogenous dataW = (W1;W2). LetM denote
the column vector of moment conditions,
M () = (M1 () ;M2 ())
0 ;
where the dimensionality of the vector of moment conditions is at least as large as there are
parameters in . An estimate b is chosen to minimize a quadratic distance measure
36
M()0AM()
for some positive denite matrix A. A preliminary estimate b0 is obtained by setting A
equal to the identity matrix. Then, a new weighting matrix is calculated as the inverse
of the sample variance of the individual moment conditions, bA = h 1P
tN
tV ar
h
M(b0)ii 1,
where N t equals the number of bidders in auction t. A second and nal estimate, b, is
then obtained from the use of this moment condition. The estimate b is consistent andpP
tN
t
b   0 is asymptotically normally distributed with zero mean and covariance
matrix 
1 +
1
L

E
@
@
M
0 bAE @
@
M
 1
;
see for example Pakes and Pollard (1989).
A Monte Carlo study revealed that the estimator is well behaved even for small number
of observations. Moreover, the rst two moments, k = 1; 2, are su¢ cient to identify the
parameter vector .
5.3 Inference of Costs
This section describes our technique to infer costs for a typical auction t. For simplicity of
exposition we omit the auction superscript. The primitive for our inference procedure is the
density of observed bids. The bid density allows us to obtain an expression for the density
of opponents low bids and the probability of winning. Costs and the cost distribution
function can then be inferred based on the rst order condition for optimal bids.
Let h(bi1; :::; b
i
s; :::; b
i
S jb;Xi) denote the estimated probability density function evaluated
at bids by bidder i on all the subsets of S conditional on Xi. For simplicity of exposition, we
denote the secret reserve prices of the auctioneer as bids submitted by bidder zero
 
b0s

sS ,
and write the density of reserve prices as h(b01; :::; b
0
s; :::; b
0
S jb;X0). This notational convention
allows us to include the reserve prices in the set of bids by is opponents. The probability
that bidder is bid (vector) bi wins exactly contract s conditional on Xi, Gs(bijb;Xi) can
be written as a function of the density of the cheapest allocation of the routes in S among
bidder is opponents conditional on Xi, which we denote as h(1)(:jb;Xi). Notice further
that the density h(1)(:jb;Xi) can be expressed directly as a function of the bid densities
h(:jb;Xj) for j = 0; : : : ; N . The analytical expressions involves multi-dimensional integrals
which are complex to calculate numerically.
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Following Judd (1998), we solve the described integration problem using Monte Carlo in-
tegration methods. The method is based on the law of large numbers and can be explained as
follows: For each bidder j 6= i we draw a bid (vector) from the density h(:jb;Xj) conditional
on the characteristics Xj . Additionally, a random reserve price (vector) is drawn from the
reserve price distribution and included in the set of bids. We then determine the cheapest
allocation of the contracts in S among bidder is opponents (b ijb;Xi) = (b i1 ; :::; b iS jb;Xi)
as dened in equation (1). We repeat this exercise L times by repeatedly drawing bids and
determining the cheapest allocation of the routes in S among bidder is opponents. The
pseudo dataof cheapest allocations, (b iljb;Xi)Ll=1, is then used directly to approximate
the probability that bidder i wins exactly route s with the bid bi contained in the interior
of the support B,28 Gs(bijb;Xi). The empirical frequency of this event is given by:
Gs(b
ijb;Xi) = Pl 1fbid bi wins exactly route sj (b iljb;Xi)g
L
,
where 1fxg = 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise. By the law of large numbers, the approxi-
mation error vanishes as L increases.29 The partial derivative @Gs=@bt, can be calculated
numerically by using one sided di¤erences with "(L) appropriately chosen.30 The numerical
di¤erence yields,
@Gs(b
ijb;Xi)
@bt
=
Gs(b
i
1; :::b
i
t; :::; b
i
S jb;Xi) Gs(bi1; :::bit   "; :::; biS jb;Xi)
"
.
Section 3 describes how to obtain the cost range associated with the bid vector bi based
on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimal bids. The Kuhn Tucker conditions are fully
characterized with the estimates of Gs, @Gs=@bt in hand. As is explained in section 3, the
cost range can be either a singleton, or a path or a higher dimensional area. Moreover,
the cost range can be calculated by varying the Lagrange multiplier(s) between 0 and 1.
Finally, we observe that our numerical approximation entails an error and the error becomes
negligible as L increases.
28For a bid bi on the boundary of the support, the probability of winning equals the limiting winning
probability of a sequence of interior bids that converges to bi. By continuity of the assumed bid density and
the randomness of the reserve price, the winning probabilities in the sequence will converge to the winning
probability at the boundary. Thus, we may approximate the winning probability of a boundary bid with
the winning probability of a close by interior bid.
29A smooth approximation of Gs is obtained by employing a kernel estimator, or similar smoother, on the
pseudo data, see Silverman (1986).
30The derivative on the boundary of the bid support can be approximated by the derivative evaluated at
close by interior bids.
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6 Estimation Results
This section describes our estimates. We report the parameter estimates of the bid density
functions in section 6.1. Section 6.2 illustrates the bidder objective function and optimal
bids. Finally, section 6.3 illustrates our estimates for cost synergy bounds and assesses
bounds on potential e¢ ciency losses due to the auction rule.
6.1 Estimates
Our data do not include information on the auctioneers reserve prices. Reserve prices are
kept secret and bidders do not know the reserve prices at the time of bid submission.31
To account for the reserve price in the estimation, we presume that a secret reserve price
is drawn independently for each route from a uniform distribution with interval support.
The boundary points of the reserve price support are assumed linear in the internal cost
estimate. Reasonable candidates for the linear coe¢ cient can be inferred from the ratio
of accepted bid to the internal cost estimate. Excluding two single route auctions which
are outliers32 an upper bound to this ratio equals 1:45. We use this number as an upper
bound for our analysis. As a lower bound for the secret reserve prices we use the internal
cost estimate. Altering the reserve price rule would not a¤ect our statistical model of bids.
In fact, in the estimation of the bid density, we lower the upper reserve price bound from
1:45 to 1:3 times the internal cost estimate to diminish possible errors stemming from the
presumed reserve price rule.33 For our cost estimates, the e¤ect of the presumed secret
reserve price is to smooth the simulated winning probability for bids that approach the
upper reserve price bound, and thus to reduce the estimated biddersmarkup over costs.
The reason for the reduced markup is that the secret reserve price has a similar e¤ect on the
calculus of bidding as adding an additional bidder. It enhances competition in the auctions
and results in reduced markups over costs.
Parameter specication and instruments: There are a number of natural restrictions
to impose on the way the parameters enter the bid density of regular bidders. The parame-
ters should be invariant with respect to permutations of the indices of sets of routes. For
31Our data include a total of ve rejected bids.
32The two excluded auctions have accepted winning bids that are 52 and 108 percent above the internal
cost estimate. These auctions consist of single contracts with an internal cost estimate of less than 50,000
Pounds. The internal cost estimate is two standard deviations below the mean internal cost estimate and
possibly erroneously measured.
33A total of six bid observations become truncated due to the reduced upper boundary point.
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the mean the invariance implies that dead mileage and other covariates should have the
same e¤ect for each contract, or formally s =  , for all s;  such that jsj = j j. For the
covariance matrix the restriction implies that the matrix  should be symmetric and that
the covariance between routes one and two should equal the covariance between routes one
and three, and so on. Formally, the restriction can be stated as s;s = ; , s; = ;s,
s;u = ;u and u;s = u; for all s;  such that jsj = j j; and s;  6= u.
In the estimation of the mean, we want to control for contract and bidder heterogeneity.
Contract heterogeneity is accounted for by dividing bids by the internal cost estimate. As
bidder specic explanatory variables for regular bidders we include linear and quadratic
expressions of the logarithm of dead mileage and the logarithm of the number of garages of
bidder i. We include a FRINGE dummy variable that equals one if the bid is submitted by a
fringe bidder and zero otherwise. Typically, fringe bidders do not have a garage established
at the time of bid submission, and we adopt the convention that the logarithm of the dead
mileage variable and the number of garage variable is equal to zero for fringe bidders. Thus,
the coe¢ cient on the FRINGE dummy takes into account the mean of fringe bids and is
measured relative to a regular bidder with no garages and dead-mileage equal to zero. This
yields the following specication for is:
is = 0 + 1DEAD-MILEAGE-i-s+ 2 (DEAD-MILEAGE-i-s)
2
+ 3NO-GARAGES-OF-i+ 4FRINGE
For a single route auction the covariance matrix  equals the parameter 1. For multi-route
auctions we specify the elements s; of the covariance matrix  as follows:
s; = 11fs= , and s is a single routeg + 21fs 6= and s\=;g + 31fs 6= and s\ 6=;g
+ 41fs= , and s is a combination routeg
The rst and last constant account for diagonal elements in , while the second and third
constant account for o¤ diagonal elements. The rst constant accounts for the variance
of a single route bid and the last constant accounts for the variance of a combination bid.
We distinguish two o¤-diagonal e¤ects depending on whether contracts s and  have a
non-empty intersection or not.
As instruments for the moment condition any of the exogenous data are admissible.
These include all bidder and auction specic variables on each auction and the powers
of these variables. The total number of instruments has to equal at least the number
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of parameters. For the mean of route combination s on auction t for bidder i we select
the following ve instruments: a constant, the dead mileage of regular bidder i to route
(combination) s, the dead mileage of bidder i to route (combination) s squared, the number
of garages of bidder i and a dummy variable that equals one if the bid is submitted by a
fringe bidder. For the second moment between bids bs and b for bidder i we select four
dummy variables as instruments. The dummies are the indicator functions dened in the
specication of s; .34 The total number of instruments equals the number of parameters
in the model, which guarantees identication.
As described in section 4, we estimate the parameters using the method of simulated
moments.
The estimates are reported in Table 3. The covariance estimates reveal the following: The
covariance estimate for bids on distinct routes, or unrelatedroutes, is positive and equals
0.09. It is signicantly di¤erent from zero. The covariance estimate for related routes,
that is for a combination of routes and a bid on a constituent stand-alone route, is negative
and equals -0.04. It is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
An alternative measure of bid correlation is the correlation coe¢ cient. Our parameter
estimates imply a positive correlation between two stand-alone bids with a correlation co-
e¢ cient of about 0.21. A bid for a combination of routes and a constituent stand-alone bid
are negatively correlated with a correlation coe¢ cient of about -0.17. Bids for related
routes may exhibit a di¤erent correlation than bids for unrelated routes if there is a
possible lack of synergies, or if there are strategic e¤ects present. We will explore these
alternative explanations below. The variance estimate of a log stand-alone bid equals 0.42.
The variance estimate of a combination bid is smaller and equals 0.11. The di¤erence in
the variance estimate for stand-alone and combination bids is signicant.
The estimates reveal the following for the mean regular bid: The bidder specic variables
have the expected e¤ects: Firms with a garage located further away from the route submit
higher bids than rms with a garage close by. The distance variable is signicant. At the
sample average values of explanatory variables, a one percent increase in distance increases
the bid by 0.68 percent. Larger rms bid less aggressively. A one percent increase in the
34Specically, the rst dummy equals one when s =  , and s is a single route, and zero otherwise. The
second dummy equals one when s 6=  and s \  = ;, and zero otherwise. The third dummy equals one
when s 6=  and s \  6= ;, and zero otherwise. And the fourth dummy equals one when s =  , and s is a
combination route, and zero otherwise.
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Table 3 Parameter Estimates for the Distribution of Bids
Observations 1525 1525 1525
Constant -0.2818 -0.2799 0.5616
(0.449) (0.5970) (0.586)
Dead-Mileage-i 0.2265 0.2259 0.2362
(0.032) (0.059) (0.068)
Dead-Mileage-i-SQ -0.1428 -0.1413 -0.5611
(0.250) (0.374) (0.369)
No-Garages-i 0.2236 0.2234 -0.0256
(0.005) (0.008) (0.126)
Fringe 1.1791 1.1771 0.2494
(0.447) (0.594) (0.624)
1 0.4168 0.4185 1.5732
(0.101) (0.1223) (3.737)
2 0.0865 0.0831 0.6284
(0.041) (0.038) (1.4649)
3 -0.0352 -0.0337 -0.0577
(0.017) (0.014) (0.221)
4 0.1063 0.1019 0.5277
(0.053) (0.041) (1.277)
Available Capacity-i 0.0010
(0.060)
5 -0.1191
(0.168)
 All continuous explanatory variables are in logarithm. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
number of garages increases the bid by 0.23 percent. Fringe bidders submit higher bids
than non-fringe bidders. The di¤erence in log bids between a fringe and a non-fringe bidder
equals 1.18.
Synergies across auctions: The covariance estimates indicate that (stand-alone) bids
submitted from the same garage are positively correlated. It may be possible that the bid
correlation extends beyond the current auction as bids from the same garage submitted at
di¤erent auctions may be related as well. For example, it may be the case that a bidder
with garage capacity already committed to earlier won contracts may be reluctant (or
eager) to win another contract. As is shown in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) the
inter auction e¤ects can be measured consistently by using a dynamic bidding game. In
London bus auctions considerable time elapses between auctions and consecutive auctions
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typically consist of routes located in distinct geographic areas of London. So, we may expect
that the intertemporal e¤ects are less important. However, we may examine whether inter
auction e¤ects are present.
The second column in Table 3 reports estimates in which the capacity committed to
routes won in prior auctions is included as an additional explanatory variable. The capac-
ity variable is constructed as the total number of buses already committed at the garage
divided by the maximum number of buses ever in operation at this garage. As is evident
in Table 3, the coe¢ cient of the capacity variable is not signicantly di¤erent from zero
and the inclusion of the additional variable does not a¤ect the other variablescoe¢ cients
signicantly. The evidence suggests that intertemporal capacity e¤ects may not be impor-
tant for London bus route auctions, or that the capacity at the garage is a poor measure
of intertemporal e¤ects. It is also possible that the auctioneer when deciding which routes
to o¤er in an auction takes potential synergies already into account and o¤ers the routes
with potential synergies in one auction. Indeed, the auctioneer tends to o¤er routes within
a geographic area at the same time which may explain the absence of intertemporal e¤ects.
Variance in bids: Our empirical specication normalizes bids by the internal cost estimate
which yields a standard deviation of log bids that varies proportionally with the internal
cost estimate. It may be possible that the bid standard deviation is of a richer functional
form that goes beyond this proportional formula. For example, it may be the case that
the standard deviation of log bids is larger on small than on large routes. To account for
this possibility, we consider an augmented specication in which the variance of log bids
(normalized by the internal cost estimate) is multiplied with the internal cost estimate to
the power of 5. If the coe¢ cient 5 is di¤erent from zero, then the standard deviation of
normalized bids can shrink or increase with the internal cost estimate. If the coe¢ cient 5
is not di¤erent from zero, then the richer specication coincides with the specication in
column one.
The estimates of the augmented variance model are reported in column three of Table 3.
The coe¢ cient for the internal cost estimate is negative but not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. We cannot reject the null that the coe¢ cient 5 is equal to zero. Thus the augmented
variance specication is rejected vis-a-vis the specication in column one. The rejection
of the augmented variance model may indicate also that our data are not su¢ ciently rich
to characterize the dependence of the variance on covariates and auction characteristics in
more detail.
Goodness of t: An economically relevant measure to the auctioneer is the procurement
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cost of the nal allocation. We use this measure to assess the goodness of t of our estimates.
The procurement cost is dened as the cheapest bidder bid allocation across all routes in
the auction. We look at bids only, and leave the auctioneers secret reserve prices aside in
the calculation of the procurement cost. To control for auction heterogeneity, we divide the
procurement cost realization by the internal cost estimate. We dene our goodness of t
measure as the sample average ratio of the procurement cost realization to the internal cost
estimate.
In the data, the procurement cost average equals 88.28 percent of the internal cost esti-
mate with a standard deviation of 22.33 percent. In order to calculate the model predicted
procurement cost, we take 10,000 simulation draws and determine the average predicted
cost across all auctions for each simulation draw. The simulated measure is lower than the
observed measure and equals 84.56. The standard deviation of the simulated measure equals
2.36 percent. We cannot reject the null that the two means are equal at the 90% condence
interval. We can conclude that our estimates predict the procurement cost reasonably well.
We also examined whether di¤erences between the simulated and observed procurement
cost depends on the internal cost estimate. Dividing our data into small and large auctions,
grouped by using the criterion whether the internal cost estimates is below or above the
median value, reveals that our estimates slightly over-predict the procurement cost for
small contracts and under-predicts it for large contracts. Yet, the relationship is weak. A
regression revealed that the internal cost estimate accounts for 2 percent in the variation of
the ratio of observed to simulated procurement cost only.
Bids on the boundary of the bid support indicate that one or more bidding constraints
are binding. As is explained in section 3, a binding bidding constraint does not allow us to
fully identify the cost vector. Instead, the cost vector is partially identied only.
Partial identication is an important element of our application. We illustrate this issue
for one and two route auctions: For single route auctions, we nd that no constraint is bind-
ing on 98 of 551 observations, or 18% of all observations. The remaining bid observations
exceed the reserve price supremum, and partial identication emerges thus on 82% of all
single route auction observations.
For two route auctions, no constraint is binding on 4 out of 210 observations. Two
percent of all observations yield a fully identied cost vector. Partial identication arises
due to distinct bidding constraints. Exactly one bid exceeds the reserve price supremum
on 7% of all observations, exactly two bids exceed the reserve price supremum on 10% of
all observations, and the combination bid constraint is binding on 14% of all observations.
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For the remaining observations all reserve price constraints are binding and a lower bound
to the cost vector is identied only.
The next section illustrates the bidder objective function and the optimal bid choices.
6.2 Illustration of the Estimates
With the bid density estimates at hand a bidders decision problem can be illustrated. We
select a hypothetical two route auction containing the route with the median internal cost
estimate and assume that both routes have an internal cost estimate equal to the sample
median internal cost estimate. The number of potential bidders and all other covariates are
taken from an auction observation of a typical bidder with 17 potential opponents. The
cost for the stand-alone routes are assumed identical and equal to 94% of the internal cost
estimate. The cost for the combination of the two routes is assumed to equal twice the cost
of a stand-alone route. We take a random sample of bids from the estimated bid density and
the secret reserve price distribution. Then, we determine the bidder´s chances of winning.
By re-sampling 5; 000 times we obtain a discrete probability distribution function of winning
probabilities as a function of the own bids. To facilitate the graphical illustration, we smooth
the chances of winning using a kernel estimator.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 depicts the bidders objective function on the vertical axis varying the combi-
nation and stand-alone bids on the horizontal axis. The combination bid on the horizontal
axis is rescaled by the factor of 1=2 to make the combination bid levels comparable with the
stand-alone bid. The solid line depicts the value of the objective function varying the com-
bination bid and holding the stand-alone bids xed at the optimal levels. The dashed line
illustrates the value of the objective function varying both stand-alone bids simultaneously,
i.e. b1 = b2, and holding the combination bid xed at the optimal level. The solid line
illustrates that the value of the objective function increases initially, and then decreases,
as the combination bid increases. At a combination bid of about 3 million Pounds, the
combination bid constraint becomes binding, and the objective function is at from then
onwards. The peak in the objective function occurs to the left of the at area illustrating
that the optimal combination bid is less than the sum of stand-alone bids. The dashed
line increases for most of the range. At a stand-alone bid of about 1:3 million Pounds, the
combination bid constraint stops binding, and the objective function has a kink increasing
more steeply from then on. Eventually, the objective function becomes at as the reserve
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Figure 1: Objective Function
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price constraint becomes binding. The optimal stand-alone bids arises at about 1:5 million
Pounds which occurs shortly before the at area at which the reserve price constraint is
binding.
Figure 1 illustrates also that the objective function appears to be well behaved with
a single maximum. Our identication and inference arguments require that biddersbids
correspond to the global maximum of their expected payo¤ functions and are thus optimal
bid choices given the opponents bids. As the rst order condition is necessary but not
su¢ cient for equilibrium, we need to verify that bids correspond to a global maximum of
the estimated payo¤ function before proceeding with the inference based on the rst order
condition.35 As a check that the global maximum requirement is satised for our data
and estimated bid distributions, we conduct the following exercise. For all observed bid
vectors we determine whether these bids correspond to a global maximum of the estimated
expected payo¤ function. To do so, we numerically calculate the optimal bid choice for the
inferred cost estimate for every observation in single and two route auctions. An exact match
between the optimal bid choice and the observed bid choice cannot be expected due to the
numerical approximation error in the cost inference and in the optimal bid calculation. Yet,
for small approximation errors, we may expect that the optimal bid vector is close to the
observed bid vector.36 We examine the issue for single route and two auctions. We nd that
for 99 percent of our observations, every component of the numerically calculated optimal
bid vector lies within a one percent radius of the observed bid.37 This numerical validation
is no proof but it gives us su¢ cient condence to proceed to estimate cost synergies.
Illustration of the optimal bid choices varying costs: Earlier we argued that even
in the absence of cost savings a combination bid may be lower than the sum of stand-
alone bids when there is not too much correlation in the value of the cheapest allocation
among opponents across contracts. We may illustrate the magnitude of the estimated
correlation in opponentslow bids by taking random samples repeatedly from the bid density
35For single unit auctions, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) show that the rst order condition together
with the condition that the bid density has a monotone hazard rate provide necessary and su¢ cient condition
for optimality of each bidders best response. For multi-unit auctions, we are not aware of a condition on
the bid density that would guarantee the su¢ ciency of the rst order condition. Instead, we compare the
observed bid vectors to the bid vectors that maximize the estimated expected payo¤ function.
36The empirical objective function can be viewed as the true objective function plus a computational
error. The computational error comes from the numerical calculation of the inverse matrix of an already
numerically approximated gradient matrix. When the computational error is small, the solution will be close
to the observed bid by the theorem of the maximum.
37The one percent threshold is not reached for one single-route and for eight two-route observations.
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for the hypothetical auction and determining the low bid for each sample. We nd that
the correlation between low stand-alone bids is positive and equals 0.06. The correlation
between the low stand-alone bid and the low combination bid is positive and of larger
magnitude. It equals 0.36. The positive correlation involving the low stand-alone bid and
the low combination bid is in part induced by the combination bid constraint which requires
that a combination bid is at most as large as the sum of stand-alone constituent bids. For
other routes characteristics and auctions we found correlations of similar magnitudes. The
small amount of correlation for stand-alone bids suggests that even without cost savings we
may expect that a bidders combination bid may be less than the sum of stand-alone bids.
Next, we illustrate the prot maximizing bids for a range of cost draws.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 depicts optimal bid choices varying the bidders cost of the route contracts.
We consider here the same auction observation and bidder as in Figure 1. We make the
following assumption about costs: The cost for the stand-alone routes are identical and the
cost for the combination of the two routes equals twice the cost of a stand-alone route. The
solid line denotes the combination bid divided by two, the dashed line equals the stand-alone
bid, and the dotted line is the 45 degree line. The prot maximizing bids are calculated at a
set of cost points and a line is drawn to connect the solutions. Due to numerical calculation
errors arising in the construction of the winning probabilities and also in the optimization
routine, the resulting line is not smooth.
Figure 2 shows that the combination bid is less than the sum of stand-alone bids for all
the cost range. The di¤erence between the sum of stand-alone bids and the combination
bid decrease gradually from 380,000 to 30,000. The relative di¤erence, normalized by the
cost, ranges between 30 and 45 percent. Figure 2 also illustrates the bidders markup as the
di¤erence between the bid and the 45 degree line. The markup decreases monotonically as
the cost increases. The markup of the combination bid ranges between 2% and 50% of the
cost.
As described earlier, on average, the relative di¤erence between the sum of stand-alone
bids and the combination bid in the data equals 1.1%, which is substantially smaller than
the hypothetical di¤erence in the absence of cost synergies depicted in Figure 2. The low
observed di¤erence suggests that there could be lack of cost synergies for London bus routes.
We will assess this hypothesis in more detail next.
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Figure 2: Optimal Bids
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6.3 Synergy Estimates
The cost synergy can be inferred based on the inverse of the estimated bid mapping as is
explained in section 3. Let it denote the cost synergy measure for bidder i on auction
t. It equals the di¤erence between the sum of stand-alone costs minus the cost for the
combination of routes and is normalized by the absolute value of the sum of stand-alone
costs:
its =
cits + c
it
   cits[
jcits + cit j
for s;   St
We take the absolute value of the sum of costs in the normalization as the sum of cost
estimates may be negative.38 The synergy measure is un-determined when a single stand-
alone bid is submitted only as there are two degrees of underidentication reected in cits[
and cit . For this reason, we omit observations with isolated stand-alone bids and calculate
the synergy measure only for those observations for which at least two stand-alone bids
are submitted. As is explained in section 3, point identication of costs is achievable if
a (full set of) non-trivial combination bid(s) is submitted in addition to stand-alone bids.
When a trivial combination bid is submitted, we evaluate the synergy measure by setting
the Lagrange multiplier of the combination bid constraint to zero. The resulting synergy
measure provides an upper bound on the magnitude of the cost synergy its .
For two route auctions there are a total of 57 bids with at least two stand-alone bids.
We omit 67 observations in which one stand-alone bid is submitted only. A total of 25 of the
57 observations have a combination bid less than the sum of stand-alone bids. The inferred
cost synergy measure is positive on 24 of 57 occasions. The median cost synergy measure
is negative and equals -0.11. The estimates imply that the route combination costs at least
11% more than the individual routes separately.
A similar picture emerges when we consider three route auctions. Again, we include bid
observations to calculate the synergy measure s when the bids satisfy one of these three
conditions: (i) the submitted bids do not violate any constraint; (ii) the combination bid
constraint between routes s and  is binding but no other constraint is binding; (iii) the
stand-alone bids bs and b are submitted and no stand-alone or combination bid involving
the third route is submitted (all other bids are above the reserve price bound). For three
route auctions there are a total of 46 observations satisfying the criterion. A total of 36
of the 46 observations have a combination bid less than the sum of stand-alone bids. To
38Negative estimates of the opportunity costs for bus operators could arise due to costs of stopping the
bus operation completely and laying o¤ the workforce, or due to long term contractual costs such as rental
agreements (for garages or buses).
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evaluate the synergy measure when the combination bid constraint is binding, we set the
Lagrange multipliers of the combination bid constraints to zero, which provides an upper
bound on the magnitude of cost synergies. The inferred synergy measure is positive on
15 of 46 occasions only. The median cost synergy measure is negative and equals -0.24.
As the measure is an upper bound on the potential cost synergy, we can conclude again
that the combination of routes in a three route auction does not cost less than the sum
of stand-alone costs. The synergy estimates appear qualitatively robust to changes in the
assumed support of the reserve price distribution.39
The evidence suggests that a bidders cost tends to increase by more than the sum of
stand-alone costs. The technology appears to exhibits decreasing returns to scale. A possible
explanation is that the technology of operating buses depends on the garage capacity. As the
number of buses in the eet approaches the garage capacity it becomes increasingly costly
to take on additional buses or routes. Possible cost savings emerging from the sharing of
spare buses and bus servicing are outweighed by cost increases due to the limited garage
size.
A bound on the e¢ ciency losses of the auction format can be inferred in the following
way: First, our cost estimates give us a lower bound on the cost of the winning allocation.40
Second, we infer costs for the remaining observed bids that did not win but that have point
identied costs. We may examine whether it would have been more e¢ cient to award one
or more routes to one of these losing bids. We ignore losing bids with partially identied
costs, and our comparison yields a lower bound to the e¢ ciency loss only.41 We illustrate
our ndings for the 36 auctions which consist of exactly two routes: We nd that the low
cost allocation di¤ers from the observed allocation on 20 of 36 occasions with a median
e¢ ciency loss equal to 7.8% of the internal cost estimate.
We can also distinguish whether the ine¢ ciency arises when a combination bid won or
when a stand-alone bid won. We nd that the main source of ine¢ ciencies is the combination
39Reducing the support of the reserve prices from [1; 1:45] to [1:2; 1:45], has the following e¤ects: The
median cost synergy estimate equals -0.30 for two route auctions and -0.13 for three route auctions.
40A lower bound on the cost of the winning allocation is obtainable as the winning bid is always observed.
If two stand-alone bids win, or if a combination bid wins both routes and the combination bid constraint is
not binding, then the cost is point identied. If a combination bid wins, and the combination bid constraint
is binding, then a lower bound to the cost of the winning allocation is identied.
41As described in section 3, if the upper bound of the reserve price is binding for a stand-alone bid and
not for the other stand-alone bid, then the cost associated with the rst stand-alone bid is not bounded
from below due to the pressence of the combination bid constraint. Notice though that this concern arises
for non-winning bids only, as a winning bid is below the reserve price by denition.
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bid. On 13 of 20 occasions the contract was awarded to a combination bid although an
award to separate bidders would have been more e¢ cient. On the remaining 7 auctions
the ine¢ ciency arises due to asymmetries as the low cost bidders bid exceeds the bid of
another bidder although the other bidder has a higher cost. This suggests that the strategic
motive for combination bidding described in section 2 may be an important element for
combination bidding.
7 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed several aspects of the rst price combinatorial auction: theory,
identication, estimation and empirical analysis. We have analyzed biddersincentives to
use combination bids in such auctions and identied a strategic motivation for doing so
that is akin to price discrimination in multi-product pricing. We have derived conditions
for the model to be identied, and more importantly, proposed a method for characterizing
bounds on the costs and distribution of costs when these conditions fail. We have proposed
a method to estimate the distribution of bids and the probabilities of winning on the basis
of data from a combinatorial auction, and have applied it to the data we collected for the
auctions of London bus routes. Based on our theoretical analysis and our identication
results, we have looked at empirical evidence for cost synergies in the London bus market.
All four aspects of our problem deserve further research. First, a full characterization
of equilibrium in the combinatorial rst price auction (including algorithms to compute the
equilibrium) and further results on revenue/cost ranking of auction formats would be use-
ful. Second, our identication results suggest that partial identication of the distribution
of costs is likely to be the rule rather than the exception in multi-unit auction data sets.
We need new results that allow us to answer meaningful policy questions even when the
primitives are only partially identied (an example along these lines for single-unit English
auctions is Haile and Tamer, 2003). Partial identication has also implications for the po-
tential generalization of our results to a¢ liated settings. Existing identication results with
a¢ liation use biddersbids as a su¢ cient statistic for their private signal when identifying
the probabilities of winning. Partial identication means that a bid no longer identies a
single cost. Thus generalization to a¢ liated settings is no longer trivial. Third, we have
attributed the unexplained variations in the bid data to bidder specic private information,
and assumed that there is no unobserved route and bidder heterogeneity. Our assumption
is satised if the econometrician has access to the same information as market participants.
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While this assumption is common in most of the empirical auction literature, the question
whether the estimation method can be extended to accommodate unobserved heterogeneity
is a challenging one.
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8 Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1: Consider the private value combinatorial rst auction model described in Section
2, without a reserve price or with a known reserve price, and with or without combination
bid constraints. Then, in any equilibrium where bidders bid on or above their costs:
(1) Bidders are indi¤erent about the way in which ties that occur with positive probability
are resolved,
(2) limb!b
P
sS(bs   cis)Gs(b) =
P
sS(b

s   cis)Gs(b) for all b 2 Bi; such that b
is bidder is optimal bid given costs ci:
(3) i(Bi3) = 0 for all i:
Proof of Lemma 1: (1) and (2): Consider bidder i. Let zs = mint6=sfb iSnt+bt; bS ; b iS g b iSns
where b is were dened in (1): Bidder is probability of winning exactly route (or route
combination) s 6= S, Gs; given his submitted bid b is
Pr(bs < zs) +  Pr(bs = zs)
where  2 [0; 1] is induced by the tie-breaking rule. This probability is discontinuous with
respect to bs at b if zs has a mass point, say at bzs. We need to consider three cases depending
on what causes the mass point at bzs :
1. bs + b iSns ties with positive probability with b
 i
Snt + bt or bS (but not with b
 i
S ) :
Let Go(b) be the probability that bidder i does not win anything with bid b or, in
other words, that the winning bid is b iS : By construction, Go(b) = 1  
P
sGs(b):
It is continuous in bs at b since, by assumption, bs + b iSns does not tie with positive
probability with b iS : Thus, so is
P
sGs(b): This implies that the only way in which it
could be optimal to submit bs is if (bs  cs) is equal to the prot bidder i makes from
the other allocations with which it ties. Otherwise, submitting a bid on route s slightly
above or slightly below bs is a protable deviation. Thus, when a tie occurs, bidder i
is indi¤erent about the way in which the tie is resolved. Moreover, his expected payo¤
is continuous.
2. bs + b iSns ties with positive probability with b
 i
S (but no other bids).
(a) Consider rst the case where the tie-breaking rule is such that lim"#0Gs(bs  
";b s)   Gs(b) > 0 (for example, if the allocation is random in case of ties). If
bs   cs > 0; submitting bs   " strictly increases bidder is expected prot for " small
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enough. If bs   cs = 0 but Gs(bs + ";b s) > 0 for some " > 0; submitting bs + " is a
protable deviation. Thus the only way in which bs could be part of an equilibrium
is if bs   cs = 0 and Gs(bs + ";b s) = 0 for all " > 0.42 But then expected payo¤ is
again continuous. Moreover, bidder i is again indi¤erent about the way in which the
tie is resolved.
(b) To complete the argument we argue that lim"#0Gs(bs   ";b s)   Gs(b) = 0
cannot happen in positive probability ties.43 To see this, suppose rst that bidder j is
responsible for the mass point in b iS  b iSns: His bid on S ties with positive probability
with his bid on Sns: Thus, applying the argument in point 1 above means that his
payo¤ from winning either allocation is the same. Given assumption 1, the set of costs
satisfying this condition has zero measure, a contradiction with the fact that bidder
j causes a mass in the distribution of b iS   b iSns. The same reasoning holds if bidder
j is responsible for the mass in the distribution of b iS and bidder k is responsible
for the mass in the distribution of b iSns: Likewise if instead of a single bidder being
responsible for the mass point, several bidders having a mass on subsets of S (resp.
Sns) are responsible for the mass points.
3. bs + b iSns ties with positive probability with b
 i
S and some other bids.
We can combine the arguments from the two previous scenarios to conclude the bid-
der is indi¤erent about the ways ties are resolved and that expected payo¤ is again
continuous.
Note that none of the arguments above relied on a particular structure on the bids. Thus
they continue to hold when a combination bid constraint is imposed. The proof also extends
to reserve prices. Reserve prices can be considered as bids submitted by the buyer, with
the exception that no best response requirements is placed on them. The only place where
the argument above relies on the behavior of bidder is opponents is in part (b) of point
2, which is never relevant for reserve prices given that lim"#0Gs(bs   ";b s)   Gs(b) > 0
always for reserve prices. This establishes statements (1) and (2) of Lemma 1.
We now proceed to proving statement (3) of Lemma 1. Note rst that, by Lemma 1(2), the
only non di¤erentiability points of biddersexpected payo¤ correspond to kinks. The rest
of the proof proceeds in three steps:
42bs   cs < 0 is ruled out by assumption 2.
43This argument is only needed for proving part (1) of the Lemma. It is not needed to prove continuity
of the equilibrium payo¤s under the London bus routes tie-breaking rule.
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Step 1: Kinks that can induce mass points in the distribution of bids.
Not all kinks are candidates to induce a mass point in the distribution of best response
bids. Consider bidder is optimization problem, maxb2R2m 1
P
sS(bs   cs)Gs(b) for some
xed cost c: Denote by @@bsGt(b)jleft and @@bsGt(b)jright, the left and right derivatives of Gt
with respect to bs at b: A necessary condition for kinks to generate a mass in bidder is
distribution of best response bids is that, for some t  S and some b;
Gt(b) +
X
sS
(bs   cs) @
@bt
Gs(b)jleft  0  Gt(b) +
X
sS
(bs   cs) @
@bt
Gs(b)jright (15)
with at least one inequality strict. Intuitively, suppose (15) is satied for b and c: Then it
is also satised for b and c0 in the neighborhood of c: Bids b such that
Gt(b) +
X
sS
(bs   cs) @
@bt
Gs(b)jleft  0  Gt(b) +
X
sS
(bs   cs) @
@bt
Gs(b)jright
with at least one inequality strict are never a best response for bidder i with cost c:
Practically, consider zs = mint6=sfb iSnt + bt; bS ; b iS g   b iSns; the bid on s that bidder i must
beat in order to win s: Kinks that are candidates to induce mass point bidding correspond
to upward jumps in the density of zs because they imply @@bsGs(b)jleft > @@bsGs(b)jright and
@
@bt
Gs(b)jleft  @@btGs(b)jright: Bids at downward jumps cause @@bsGs(b)jleft < @@bsGs(b)jright
and @@btGs(b)jleft  @@btGs(b)jright and can thus never be best responses.
Step 2: zS = mins 6=Sfbis + b iSns; b iS g has no kink in its distribution that generate mass
points in the distribution of best response bids by bidder i:
Fix bi S and dene zS = mins 6=Sfbis + b iSns; b iS g with support in [zS ; zS ]: Note that any
bidder-bid combination with realization in [zS ; zS) has a strictly positive probability of
winning. Thus the bids that make up for those allocations must be strictly above costs.
Suppose the distribution of zS has a kink at bzS that induces a mass point in the distribution
of best response bids by bidder i: From step 1, this kink must be caused by an upward jump
in its density at bzS : Upward jumps can happen for two reasons:
1. The random variables bis+ b
 i
Sns and b
 i
S do not all have the same support and bzS is at
the lower bound of the support of one of these variables.
2. The random variables bis+b
 i
Sns or b
 i
S have a discontinuous density for values for which
they have a strictly positive probability of winning.
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We rst consider the case where the kink happens at the boundary of the support of b iS or
because of a discontinuity of its density. Towards a contradiction suppose that, as a result,
i(febi 2 Bi : ebiS = bzSg) > 0. We consider two subcases:
1. There exists j 6= i such that the density of bjS has an upward jump at bzS . Bidder js
bid ties with strictly positive probability with biS : From lemma 1(1), it must be that
bjS = c
j
S . This contradicts optimality because this bid wins with strictly positive
probability. We conclude that the kink cannot be caused by a discontinuity in the
density of bjS after all.
2. There exist j; k 6= i such that the density of bjSnt + bkt is discontinuous at bzS when
bjSnt + b
k
t = b
 i
S = zS : (note: if the kink is made of more than two bids, the same
reasoning applies). Because bjSnt + b
k
t is the sum of two independently distributed
random variables, its density is continuous on its support and vanishes to zero at the
boundary of its support, ruling out a kink unless one of bjSnt or b
k
t has a mass point.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that bkt has a mass point at x: Let b
j
Snt;L denote
the lower bound of the support of bjSnt: We have bzS = x + bjSnt;L: Consider bidder j.
His bid bjSnt;L ties with positive probability with b
i
S : By lemma 1(1), b
j
Snt;L = c
j
Snt:
This contradicts optimality because this bid wins with strictly positive probability.
We conclude that the kink cannot be caused by a kink in the distribution of bjSnt+ b
k
t :
We next consider the case where the kink happens at the lower bound of the support of
bis + b
 i
Sns for some s; or at an upward jump in the density of b
i
s + b
 i
Sns. Let x = bzS   bis:
Suppose that the resulting kink implies that, at equilibrium, i(febi 2 Bi : ebiS = ebis + x;
GiS(
ebi) > 0 and Gis(ebi) > 0g) > 0. We consider two subcases.
1. There exists j 6= i such that the density of bjSns has an upward jump at x: Bidder js
bid ties with strictly positive probability with bidder is bid on S: Thus from Lemma
1(1), it must be that bjSns = c
j
Sns: This contradicts optimality because this bid wins
with strictly positive probability. We conclude that the kink at bzS cannot have been
caused by a discontinuity in the density of bjSns:
2. There exists k; j 6= i; such that the density of bkw + bjw0 (w \ w0 = ? and w [ w0 = Sns);
is discontinuous at x: Because is the sum of two independently distributed random
variables, it must be that one of them has a mass point. Suppose bkw has a mass point
at y: Thus x = y + bjw0;L (b
j
w0;L is the lower bound of the support of b
j
w0): Consider
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bidder j : his bid on w0 ties with positive probability with biS : Thus b
j
w0;L = c
j
w0 : This
contradicts optimality because this bid has a strictly positive probability of winning.
We conclude that zS has no kink that generates mass points in the distribution of bids by
bidder i.
Step 3: zt = mins 6=tfbis + b iSns; b iS ; biSg   b iSnt; t 6= S; has no kink that generates a mass
point in the distribution of best response bids by bidder i:
Random variable zt di¤ers from zS in two respects. First, the presence of biS in the denition
of zt means that mins 6=tfbis+ b iSns; b iS ; biSg has necessarily a mass point at its upper bound,
biS : Second, the fact that zt is the di¤erence between two random variables means that a
necessary condition for zt to have a kink is that one of mins 6=tfbis+ b iSns; b iS ; biSg or b iSnt has
a mass point and that the other does not have a vanishing density at its boundaries (unless
mins 6=tfbis + b iSns; b iS ; biSg and b iSnt are perfectly correlated which could only be the case if
N = 2 but, in this case, zS has also a kink and thus this case is covered by the previous
one). We distinguish four cases:
1. The kink in zt is due to the mass point in the distribution of mins 6=tfbis+ b iSns; b iS ; biSg
at biS :
This creates an upward jump in the density of zt at biS   b iSnt;H , where b iSnt;H is
the lower bound to b iSnt. Suppose that as a result 
i(febi 2 Bi : ebit + b iSnt;H = ebiS ;
Git(
ebi) > 0g) > 0. We consider two subcases:
(a) There exists j 6= i such that bjSnt = b iSnt;H . Bidder js bid ties with positive prob-
ability with b jS ; implying that b
j
Snt = cSnt (Lemma 1(1)). But this contradicts
optimality given that this bid has a strictly positive probability of winning.
(b) There exists j; k 6= i such that bjw;H + bkw0;H = b iSnt;H (w \ w0 = ? and w [ w0 =
Snt): Because by assumption b iSnt has a non vanishing density at b iSnt;H ; it must
be that j or k has a mass on their bids. Suppose j has a mass at bjw;H : Consider
bidder k: His bid ties with strictly positive probability with biS ; implying that
bjw = cw (Lemma 1(1)). But this contradicts optimality given that this bid has
a strictly positive probability of winning.
2. The kink in zt is due to a mass point in the distribution of b iSns at x when Gs > 0:
This creates an upward jump in the density of zt at bis + x   b iSnt;H (b iSnt;H is the
upper bound to b iSnt): Suppose that, as a result, 
i(febi : ebit  ebis = x  b iSnt;H ; Gs(ebi);
Gt(ebi) > 0g) > 0 holds. We consider two subcases.
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(a) There exists j 6= i such that bjSnt = b iSnt;H . If j is not responsible for the mass
at x; his bid ties with positive probability with b jS ; implying that b
j
Snt = cSnt
(Lemma 1(1)). This contradicts optimality given that this bid has a strictly
positive probability of winning. If, instead j is responsible for the mass at x;
then his bids on Sns and Snt tie with positive probability. By Lemma 1(1), he
must be indi¤erent between the prots he makes from both bids. A contradiction
with the mass that he places at x:
(b) There exists j; k 6= i such that bjw;H + bkw0;H = b iSnt;H (w \ w0 = ? and w [ w0 =
Snt): Because by assumption b iSnt has a non vanishing density at b iSnt;H ; it must
be that j or k has a mass on their bids. Suppose j has a mass at bjw;H : Consider
bidder k: Suppose bidder k is not responsible for the mass in the distribution of
b iSns: Then, his bid ties with positive probability with b
 k
S implying c
k
w0 = b
k
w0;H :A
contradiction with the fact that this bid wins with strictly positive probability. If
instead bidder k is responsible for the mass in b iSns Then his bids on Sns and w0
tie with positive probability. By lemma 1(1), he must be indi¤erent between the
prots he makes from both bids. A contradiction with the mass that he places a
mass at x:
3. The kink in zt is due to a mass point in the distribution of b iS at x: This creates an
upward jump in the density of zt at x   b iSnt;H : Suppose that as result, (ebi : ebit =
x  b iSnt;H ; Gt > 0) > 0. Same arguments as before.
4. The kink in zt is due to a mass point in the distribution of b iSnt : this case is identical
to case 2 above, once we consider zs instead of zt:
Steps 2 and 3 imply that there is no kink in bidder is objective function that induces a mass
point in the distribution of his best response bids. Thus (Bi3) = 0 implies that i(Bi3):
This concludes the proof for statement (3). Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: Consider matrix rG(bi) (with elements dened by rGt;s(bi) = @@btGs(bi))
evaluated at any optimal bid vector bi by bidder i. Then:
(1) @@btGt(b
i)  0 for all t; and strictly so if Gt(bi) > 0.
(2) @@btGs(b
i)  0 for all t 6= s:
(3)
P
s
@
@bt
Gs(b
i)  0 for all t; and strictly so for some t if there exists s  S such that
Gs(b
i) > 0.
(4) rG(bi) is invertible if Gs(bi) > 0 for all s:
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(5) The determinant of any submatrix made from removing some rows and the corre-
sponding columns of rG has sign (-1)r where r is the number of remaining rows/columns if
all bid components in bi except those removed have a strictly positive probability of winning.
Proof of Lemma 3: (1), (2) and (3): Given m routes, there are 2m possible allocations
between bidder i and his opponents: Either bis + b
 i
Sns generates the cheapest allocation, in
which case bidder i wins exactly contract s, or b iS yields the lowest cost, in which case
bidder i does not win anything.
Any increase in bit makes the allocation that corresponds to b
i
t+b
 i
Snt more expensive relative
to the other ones, but it otherwise does not a¤ect the relative ranking of bis+b
 i
Sns; s 6= t; and
b iS : Hence the probability that any of these competing allocations wins cannot decrease:
@
@bt
Gs  0 for s 6= t. Likewise, the probability that allocation bit+ b iSnt wins cannot increase:
@
@bt
Gt  0: Finally,
P
s
@
@bt
Gs  0 for all t (since
P
sGs corresponds to one minus the
probability that b iS wins).
If bit has a strictly positive probability of winning, i.e. Gt > 0,
@
@bt
Gt must be strictly
negative, for otherwise increasing bit by epsilon would make bidder i strictly better o¤
(given the previous argument, raising bit does not hurt the expected prot bidder i makes
from his other bids), a contradiction with the fact that bi is optimal:
We now show that
P
s
@
@bt
Gs < 0 for some t when bi contains at least one bid that has a
positive probability of winning: Towards a contradiction, suppose that
P
s
@
@bt
Gs = 0 for
all t: This means that the support of minsSfbis + b iSnsg is distinct from the support of b iS
(none of bidder is bids compete with b iS ).
44 Since one of bidder is bids wins sometimes:45
min
sS
fbis + b iSnsg  b iS ; for all realizations of b i (16)
Since bi is optimal
max
b i
fmin
sS
fbis + b iSns   b iS gg = 0
(for otherwise increasing all bids by epsilon would be a protable deviation for bidder i).
But this means that b iS competes at least with one of bidder is bids. Hence
P
s
@
@bt
Gs < 0
for at least one t:
(4) We introduce the notation contract 0with the convention that bi0 = 0, Snf0g = S,
and say that bidder i wins contract 0 when b iS corresponds to the winning allocation. With
this denition, G0 = 1 
P
sGs:
44The random variables here are b i; bi is xed.
45The expression in (16) implicitly assumes that the supports of minsSfbis + b iSnsg and b iS are convex.
It is straightforward to adapt the argument to non convex supports.
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The following denition will be useful:
Denition: 
  S [ f0g forms a connected chain of substitutes if, for all s and s0  

(s 6= s0 and s0 6= 0); either @@bs0Gs > 0 or there exist w1; :::; wn  
 such that
@
@bw1
Gw1s >
0; @@bw2
Gw1 > 0; :::;
@
@bs0
Gwn > 0:
Claim 1: If Gs(bi) > 0 for all s  S, then 
 = S [ f0g forms a connected chain of
substitutes.
Proof: By property (1), @@bsGs < 0; so any contract s  S must be connected with at
least one other contract. By property (3), contract 0 is connected to at least one other
contract. Now, if two contracts in 
 are not connected, they must exist at least two disjoint
sets of contracts in 
, with no contract in the rst set connected with a contract in the
other set. We prove that if Gs(bi) > 0 for all s  S; then 
 forms a connected chain
of substitutes. Towards a contradiction, suppose that set fs; tg and the rest form two
disjoint sets of contracts (the focus on a set of two contracts is without loss of generality).
Consider the following random variables, minfbit+ b iSnt; bis+ b iSnsg and minw 6=t;sfbiw+ b iSnwg:
Since all bids have a positive probability of winning, sometimes minfbit + b iSnt; bis + b iSnsg 
minw
;w 6=t;sfbiw + b iSnwg (bidder i wins contract s or t) and sometimes minfbit + b iSnt; bis +
b iSnsg  minw
;w 6=t;sfbiw+b iSnwg: Hence minfbit+b iSnt; bis+b iSnsg = minw
;w 6=t;sfbiw+b iSnwg
must happen for some realization of b i given that bi is optimal (if those supports were
disjoint there would be a scope for a protable deviation). Therefore, s or t must compete
directly with some w in the other set, i.e. @@btGw or
@
@bs
Gw > 0: A contradiction.
We can now prove that detrG < 0 (so that rG is invertible). The proof is by induction.
Property (3) holds strictly for at least one contract. We relabel the rows and columns of
matrix rG such that the sum of the elements in the rst row is strictly negative (this does
not change the value of the determinant):X
s
@
@b1
Gs < 0 (17)
Consider the linear transformation L1 on the columns ofrG that adds to column s 6= 1, 1s
times column 1 such that @@b1Gs + 1s
@
@b1
G1 = 0 for s 6= 1 (notice, 1s  0 and
P
1s < 1
given (17)): This leaves the rst row of matrixrG with all zeros except in the rst position.
Denote the resulting matrix by L1rG and let [L1rG] be matrix L1rG from which the
rst row and the rst column have been removed. Since determinants are invariant to linear
transformations, detrG = detL1rG = @@b1G1 det[L1rG]:
We claim that the resulting 2m x 2m matrix [L1rG] satises properties (1) to (3) of the
original matrix, including the strict inequalities. Property (1): The diagonal elements of
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matrix [L1rG] are equal to @@bsGs + 1s @@bsG1: Since the @@bsGt elements satisfy properties
(1) to (3) and 1i < 1; we have @@bsGs + 1s
@
@bs
G1 < 0: Property (2): The o¤-diagonal of
the new matrix are equal to @@bsGt + 1t
@
@bs
G1  0 since it is a sum of positive elements.
Property (3): The sum of the row elements of the [L1rG] matrix is equal to
P
s 6=1
@
@bt
Gs+
@
@bt
G1
P
s 6=1 1s  0 since
P @
@bt
Gs  0 and
P
s 6=1 1s < 1: To show that this inequality
holds strictly for at least one row of the new matrix [L1rG], we need to consider two
cases. First, if any of the elements @@bsG1 of the rst column of the original matrix was
strictly positive, then since
P
s 6=1 1s < 1; there exists a row in the new matrix such that
condition (3) holds strictly. If @@bsG1 = 0 for all s 6= 1, contract 1 is directly connected only
to contract 0: But then by claim 1, it must be that one of the remaining contracts, say t;
is also connected to contract 0: This means that
P
s
@
@bt
Gs < 0 for that contract t in the
original matrix, and in the new matrix:
Repeating the argument leads to sign(detrG) = sign( 1)2m 1 < 0:
To prove the last part of the claim we show that any submatrix made fromrG by removing
some rows and the corresponding columns has the same properties (1) to (3), including the
strict inequalities. The proof then proceeds as before. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: Consider the combinatorial rst price auction model with reserve prices and,
possibly, a combination bid constraint.
(1) Identication of costs. Consider any equilibrium bid vector bi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2:
(i) Suppose Gs(bi) > 0 for some s  S; then upper and lower bounds to cis are identied
following (12) and (13). In particular, if Gs(bi) > 0 for all s  S and bi satises strictly
all combination bid constraints (if any applies), then ci is point identied.
(ii) Suppose Gs(bi) = 0 for some s  S and the auction does not have a combination
bid constraint. Then a lower bound to cis; c
i
s; is identied following (9). If b
i
s(b
i s) = Rs
then cis = Rs:
(iii) Suppose Gs(bi) = 0 for some s  S and the auction has a combination bid
constraint. Then a lower bound to cis; c
i
s; is identied following (9) if Gt(b
i) > 0 or
Gt(b
i
s(b
i s);bi s) = 0 for all t  s: No bound is identied otherwise.
(2) (Partial) Identication of the distributions of costs. For all i; let i(:) :
Bi1 [ Bi2  R2m 1 dene the mapping from bidder is equilibrium bids to the set of costs
(obtained from the application of (1)) that are consistent with them. Any Fi 2 F such that
F i(c) = i(fbi 2 Bi1 [ Bi2 : ei(bi)  c)g) for some selection ei of i; is consistent with the
observed equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2:
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Part (1). (i) and the rst part of (ii) follow directly from the arguments in the main text.
We prove that if b
i
s(b
i s) = Rs then cis = Rs when there is no combination bid constraint.
When the reserve price binds, limbbs"Rs Gs(bbs;bi s) > 0. From Lemma 1(1), we can consider
without loss of generality that Gs(Rs;bi s) = 0: Since bidder i did not submit a bid on
contract s below the reserve price, the following must hold for all bbs < Rs :
X
t6=s
(bit   ct)Gt(bbs;bi s) + (bbs   cs)Gs(bbs;bi s) X
t6=s
(bit   ct)Gt(Rs;bi s) (18)
Because limbbs"Rs Gt(bbs;bi s) = Gt(Rs;bi s); for all t 6= s; the claim follows directly from the
fact that limbbs"Rs Gs(bbs;bi s) > 0: This completes the proof for (ii).
We now consider the case where there is a combination bid constraint. The di¤erence with
the previous argument is that a bid on contract s can dene a bid on contract w  s: Thus a
bidder may not want to submit a bid on a contract s for fear that doing so would generate,
via the combination bid constraint, a bid on contract w that has a positive probability
of winning. Formally, the equivalent of expression (9) is now (s is a contract such that
Gs(b
i) = 0; Gt(b
i) > 0 for t 2 K)
lim
bs"bis
Gs(bs;b
i
 s) +
X
t2K
(bit   cit)
@
@bs
Gt(b
i
s;b
i
 s) + (b
i
s   cis)
@
@bs
Gs(b
i
s;b
i
 s)
+
X
ws;Gw(bi)=0 but Gw(bis;bi s)>0
(b
i
s + b
i
wns   ciw)
@
@bs
Gw(b
i
s;b
i
 s)  0
Unlike before we now have several unknows in this expression, cis as well as the c
i
ws if
there exists w  s;Gw(bi) = 0 but Gw(bis;bi s) > 0. Proceeding by iteration, one could
rst identify cost ranges for the ciws: c
i
w  ciw: However, with binding combination bid
constraints, the left derivative @@bsGw(b
i
s;b
i s) is negative thus the bounds on ciw are useless
to pin down a bound on cis: If there is no w such that w  s;Gw(bi) = 0 but Gw(bis;bi s) > 0;
then the last term disappears and we are back to (9).
Part (2): The arguments in part (1) covered all the bids in Bi1 and Bi2 which is enough
given that by Lemma 1(3), bids in Bi3 are submitted by a zero measure of costs. The rest
of the claim follows. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3: (1) For any bundle s that wins with strictly positive probability, cis depends
positively on the value of s=t[w; and negatively on t=s[w for all s; t and w:
(2) Consider any t and w such that t \ w = ;: If the combination bid constraint for these
contracts is the only binding combination bid constraint at the optimum, an upper bound to
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the synergy involved between these two contracts is given by the solution ct + cw   ct[w of
the system in (11) when the Lagrangian multiplier ft[wg=t[w is set equal to zero.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Preliminaries: The proof uses the following properties of determinants: (1) Determinants
are invariant to linear transformations of rows or columns, (2) permuting rows (or columns)
just changes the sign of the determinant, (3)
det
2664
a11 + b11 :: a1N
:: ::
aN1 + bN1 :: aNN
3775 = det
2664
a11 :: a1N
:: ::
aN1 :: aNN
3775 + det
2664
b11 :: a1N
:: ::
bN1 :: aNN
3775 ; and (4)
the multiplication of any row or column by a constant, multiplies the value of the determi-
nant by that constant.
Proof of Part (1): Consider any equilibrium bid vector bi. Let K  2S be the set of all
contracts which bi wins with strictly positive probability and let biK denote the bids in
bi restricted to K (similarly, ciK denote the cost vector associated with K): >From the
derivation in the main text,
(biK ciK)r bG(biK) = D(biK ;)
where
D(biK ;) =   bG(biK) +X
r
X
t;wr; t\w=;;
jtjjwj
r=t[wIr=t[w
with Ir=t[w, the jKj x 1 vector with entry 1 in the row corresponding to contract r and
entry -1 in the rows corresponding to contracts t and w:
Let AsB denote matrix A whose column corresponding to contract s has been replaced by
vector B: Cramers rule together with properties (3) and (4) of determinants imply that
bis   cis =
1
detr bG detr bGsD(biK ;)
=
1
detr bG [ detr bGs bG+Xr2K
X
t;wr; t\w=;;
jtjjwj
r=t[w detr bGsIr=t[w ]
Step 1: detr bGrIr=t[w = 0 or, if not, sign(detr bGrIr=t[w) = sign(-1jKj 1).
Proof: r bGrIr=t[w is the jKj by jKj matrix r bG whose column r is replaced by a column
with +1 at row r; and -1 at rows t and w: Dene Lr as the operator that adds the values
associated with row r to rows t and w so that LrrGrIr=t[w becomes a matrix with a zero
column at position r except for the 1entry at row r: DeneM as the jKj   1 by jKj   1
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matrix made of matrix Lrr bGrIr=t[w from which the row and the column corresponding to
contract r have been removed. By construction and property (1) of determinants, detM =
detLrr bGrIr=t[w = detr bGrIr=t[w :
MatrixM has the following properties: (a) All diagonal elements are negative. This follows
from Lemma 3(1) for the rows associated with contracts 6= t and w. The diagonal elements
for rows t and w are @@brGt +
@
@bt
Gt and @@brGw +
@
@bw
Gw respectively, which are also nega-
tive by Lemma 3(3). (b) All o¤-diagonal elements are positive. Again this follows directly
from Lemma 3(2) in the case of rows 6= t; w: For rows t and w; the diagonal elements are
@
@br
Gu+
@
@bt
Gu , u 6= r; t; and @@brGu+ @@bwGu; u 6= r; w; which are positive by Lemma 3(2). (c)
The sum of the column elements are negative for every column. Consider for example col-
umn u: The sum of its elements are
P
x 6=r;t;w
@
@bx
Gu+ (
@
@br
Gu+
@
@bt
Gu) + (
@
@br
Gu+
@
@bw
Gu);
in other words, the change in the probability of winning u when all bids are marginally in-
creased (with the constraint that br = bt+ bw): Clearly, this cannot increase the probability
that the bidder wins contract u:
We can now apply a similar induction technique as used in Lemma 3 to prove that, if detM
is not zero, sign(detM) = sign( 1jKj 1): The two di¤erences relative to the proof in Lemma
3 are that we work on the columns instead of the rows and that all inequalities are weak.
Dene operator P 1 which operates on the rows of matrix M and adds to row u 6= 1; u1
such thatMu1+u1M11 = 0 (u1  0 and
P
u u1  1):46 It is straightforward to check that
the resulting matrix, P 1M, satises properties (a) through (c). Therefore we can reiterate
this process until the end or until the rst column of the resulting matrix is all zeroes. This
proves the claim.
Step 2: detr bGtIr=t[w = 0 or, if not, sign(detr bGtIr=t[w) =   sign(-1jKj 1):
Proof: Matrix r bGtIr=t[w corresponds to matrix r bG; whose column t has been replaced
by a column with +1 at position r and  1 at positions t and w: In particular, note that
position (t; t) is equal to  1: Dene the operator Lt that adds row r to row w and adds
row t to row r so that only a  1 at position t remains in column t: Dene M as the
jKj   1 by jKj   1 matrix made of matrix Ltr bGtIr=t[w from which the row and the
column corresponding to contract t have been removed. By construction and property (1)
of determinants, detM =  detLtr bGtIr=t[w =  detr bGtIr=t[w :
MatrixM has the following properties: (a) All diagonal elements are negative. This follows
from Lemma 3(1) for the rows associated with contracts 6= r and w. The diagonal elements
46 If M11 = 0, the rst column contains only zero entries given properties (b) and (c) so we are done.
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for rows r and w are @@brGr+
@
@bt
Gr and @@brGw+
@
@bw
Gw respectively, which are also negative
by Lemma 3(3).
(b) All o¤-diagonal elements are positive, except for the entry in row w and column r. Again
this follows directly from Lemma 3(2) in the case of rows 6= r; w: The o¤-diagonal entries
in row r are equal to @@brGu +
@
@bt
Gu , u 6= r; t: These are positive given Lemma 3(2). The
o¤-diagonal entries in row w are equal to @@brGu +
@
@bw
Gu; u 6= t; w: Again these are posi-
tive except when u = r: (c) The sum of the column elements are negative for every column.
Consider for example column u: The sum of its elements are
P
x 6=r;t;w
@
@bx
Gu + (
@
@br
Gu +
@
@bt
Gu)+(
@
@br
Gu+
@
@bw
Gu); in other words, the change in the probability of winning u when
all bids are marginally increased (with the constraint that bs = bt+bw): Clearly, this cannot
increase the probability that the bidder wins bundle s:
We can now proceed as before by operating on columns u 6= r; w until the matrix is reduced
to a 2 by 2 matrix (corresponding to the columns r and w): We will then argue that this
2 by 2 matrix has negative entries except at position (2; 1) so its determinant is positive.
The claim then follows from the fact that this number must be multiplied by the product
of jKj   2 negative numbers.
Formally, dene the operator P u (u 6= r; w) on M that adds xu time row u onto row x;
x 6= u; such Mxu+xuM uu = 0 (note xu  0 and
P
xu  1): The resulting matrix has a
zero column at position u except for M uu: Thus detM equals M uu times the determinant
of matrix M from which row u and column u have been removed. It is easy to check
that this resulting matrix satises conditions (a) through (c) above. The only non obvious
condition is condition (b). This follows because both
P
x6=r;t;w
@
@bx
Gr + (
@
@br
Gr +
@
@bt
Gr)
and
P
x 6=r;t;w
@
@bx
Gr + (
@
@br
Gr +
@
@bw
Gr) are negative (these expressions correspond to the
change in the probability of winning r when all bids but w - resp. t - are raised with the
constraint that br = bt + bw): Applying operator P u for all u 6= r; t; w yields the 2 by 2
matrix mentioned above. Hence sign(detM) = ( 1jKj 3):
Part (1) of Theorem 3 then follows from steps 1 and 2 and the fact that sign(detr bG) =
sign( 1jKj):
Proof of Part (2): The only non zero multiplier is ft[wg=t[w: From part (1), the costs
identied by setting it equal to zero correspond to upper bounds to ct and cw and a lower
bound to cft[wg: This identies the maximum level of synergy consistent with the observed
behavior: ct + cw   cft[wg: QED.
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9 Appendix B: Data sources and coding issues
9.1 Data sources:
London Buses tendering program: For each auction and route in the auction, this
document provides the tender issue date, the tender return date, the planned start of the
contract, the contract duration, together with the start and end point of the routes in the
auction.
Bid evaluation documents: These are London Transport Buses internal documents
assessing the bids received for one to several routes in a auction. These documents provide
information on all route characteristics, including the identity of the incumbent when this
is an existing route, the bids received (including combination bids), the identity of the
bidders and, most of the time, the garage from which they plan to operate the route.47
These documents analyze the bids received and make an award recommendation. When
this recommendation deviates from the lowest price criterion, the criterion used is detailed
and justied.
Route history: History of all the London Bus routes since 1934, compiled by the London
Omnibus Traction Society (LOTS). For each route, this data contains information on the
identity of the bus bidder, the garage from which operation is carried out, the bus type and
peak vehicle requirements (PVR) for weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays. For our analysis
we have used weekdays PVR.
Garage history: Document compiled by the London Omnibus Traction Society (LOTS)
since the deregulation in 1985. Provides information on openings, closings and transfers
of bus garages used for London bus routes. This document is also our primary source of
information for entry, mergers and acquisition (secondary sources included London Buses
internal memos, companieswebsites and LOTSLondon Bus and Tram eetbook publica-
tions).
Price deator: Bids are deated (Dec. 1995) based on the LTB ination index formula for
the bus services, a weighted index for the retail petroleum prices (5%), labor prices (65%)
and retail price index (30%). The data comes from the UK Energy Trends and the UK
Monthly Digest of Statistics.
47Missing values for the garage locations were completed using the bidders closest garage to any of the
end points of the route at the time of the tender return.
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9.2 Coding issues:
Route Alternatives: London Transport Buses sometimes species alternative specica-
tions for a route (di¤erent bus types, frequencies or routing, for example). By convention,
we have coded only the bid information related to the awarded service specication.
Age of vehicle: Vehicle age is the only dimension of the o¤er, besides price, that is not
specied by London Buses. Hence, bidders often submit di¤erent bid - vehicle age combi-
nations. In the data, we have coded the bids for both existing and new buses. However, we
did not nd evidence that would suggest a trade-o¤ between age and bid levels in the award
decision. Rather, London Transport Buses seems to evaluate bids holding the age dimension
constant, and award decisions are in practice indistinguishable from the award decisions of
a contracting authority that would randomize between the age category it prefers, and then
selects the best bid within that category. As a result, strategic interactions between the bids
along the age dimension can be ignored, and in our empirical analysis, we have focused on
the bids submitted for the age category that has attracted bids from the greatest number
of bidders.
Auctions: By denition, an auction is a set of routes auctioned at the same time. For our
analysis, we have split several of the original auctions into independent subauctions when the
following criteria were satised: (1) The two subsets of routes were in distinct geographical
areas of London, (2) No combination bids were submitted across the two subsets of routes,
and (3) The bids received on the two di¤erent subsets of routes originate from two di¤erent
sets of bidders, or at least from two di¤erent sets of garages.
9.3 Computational Details
We describe here the practical details of the computational approach.
Winning probabilities: As described in section 4, the winning probabilities can be con-
structed in two ways: (i) simulated and (ii) simulated and smoothed. Simulated winning
probabilities result in a step function, and with su¢ ciently many simulation draws the
approximation will be accurate. Simulated and smoothed winning probabilities are addi-
tionally treated with a kernel smoother. The simulated and smoothed winning probabilities
are suitable for optimization algorithms as they can be evaluated quickly and yield a smooth
objective function.
We use the simulated winning probabilities with a large number of simulation draws of
50; 000 in the cost inference. In the construction of the objective function in Figures 1 and
68
2, and in the validity check of the rst order condition, we use simulated and smoothed
winning probabilities based on 5; 000 simulation draws.
The computational details of the construction of winning probabilities is the following:
We draw opponentsbids from the estimated normal bid density using the normal random
variable generator built into the software package GAUSS. We then determine the cheapest
allocation for all possible subsets of routes from the set of low opponentsbids following
equation (1). We repeat this process 5; 000 times for simulated and smoothed winning
probabilities and 50; 000 times for simulated winning probabilities. These simulations give
us the pseudo data to assess winning chances.
The simulated winning probabilities are then the empirical cumulative distribution func-
tion based on the simulated pseudo data. The function is a step function.
To avoid discrete jumps in the winning probabilities, the simulated and smoothed win-
ning probabilities use the simulated pseudo data with a kernel estimator. The kernel esti-
mator uses a product of normal kernels and a bandwidth equal to the standard deviation of
low opponents bid prices for all items times 2=25. The bandwidth is chosen based on visual
inspection.
Optimization: In the consistency check of the rst order conditions and in the construc-
tion of Figure 2, we calculate optimal bids for each observation by using the optimization
algorithm supplied in the software package GAUSS. In the consistency check of the rst
order condition, we start the algorithm at three distinct and randomly chosen values. In the
construction of the gure, we experiment with alternative starting values based on adjacent
points to nd the maxima.
Cost inference: We employ simulated winning probabilities based on a sample of 50; 000
simulated data points. To calculate the gradient of the probability of winning, we take the
di¤erential evaluated at a one percent change in the bid vector. If the resulting derivative
is zero, we take the di¤erential evaluated at a ve percent of the bid. The inverse matrix
of the gradient is calculated numerically using the software package GAUSS.
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